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ABSTRACT 
VIETNAM IN TURMOIL: 
THE JAPANESE COUP, THE OSS, AND THE AUGUST REVOLUTION 
IN 1945 
By EDWARD TAYLOE WISE 
MASTER OF ARTS in History 
University of Richmond, 1991 
David C. Evans, Thesis Director 
World War II brought about the demise of colonialism. The 
Japanese overthrew the French Indochinese government in March 
1945. Their establishment of a puppet government encouraged the 
Vietnamese to seek independence. Ho Chi Minh, who had a 
Communist background, was ready to lead his nation, and was 
assisted in that undertaking by the United States Office of 
Strategic Services (OSS), the precursor of the Central 
Intelligence Agency. This work explores Ho Chi Minh's 
nationalist and Communist background along with the role that the 
OSS played in his rise to power in 1945. 
Primary sources include U.S. Government documents and many 
memoirs written by the participants of this period. 
It concludes that Ho Chi Minh was first a nationalist and 
secondarily a communist. It also concludes that the United 
States had an opportunity in 1945 to greatly influence the course 
of Vietnam's history, but failed to do so because of other more 
pressing geopolitical postwar problems. 
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CHAPTER I 
ROOSEVELT AND VIETNAM 
Between 1960 and 1975, the United States engaged in a 
futile, frustrating, and costly war in Vietnam. The 
tenacious and inexplicable resistance of the Vietnamese to 
the militarily superior American forces stemmed from Asian 
nationalism that had gradually been gathering strength in 
the late colonial era. Americans, themselves once 
colonists, should have understood the Vietnamese desire for 
freedom. During World War II President Franklin Delano 
Roosevelt was a profound opponent of European imperialism 
and, not surprisingly, envisioned a postwar settlement that 
would have ended French dominion over Indochina. From about 
1950 onward, however, the concerns of the cold war 
overwhelmed American political leaders. The ramifications 
of Roosevelt's anti-colonialism, along with rising 
nationalism in far away lands, were ignored. Eventually, Ho 
Chi Minh's Vietnam was viewed as nothing more than a 
Communist threat, and America soon found itself involved in 
a war to contain it. 
It is especially ironic that, in light of these facts, 
Ho Chi Minh, and his followers, the Viet Minh, received 
their first professional military training from the United 
States. A small team of American servicemen, supplied by 
the Office of Strategic Services {OSS), were parachuted into 
1 
2 
the jungle of northern Tonkin in July 1945 to assist the 
Viet Minh in their guerilla struggle against the 
Japanese troops that were occupying Indochina. Moreover, as 
shown herein, actual American military and intelligence 
involvement in Vietnam had begun earlier in the war. The 
purpose of this study is to explore these American­
Vietnamese relationships and to discuss the Vietnamese 
nationalism that, ultimately, had such a staggering impact 
on American history. 
To understand President Roosevelt's views, a short 
review of Asian colonialism is necessary. European 
economic expansion into Asia during the latter half of the 
19th century has been termed neomercantilism.1 The mother 
country (in the case of Vietnam, France) brought the colony 
into its tariff and commercial orbit. The colony then 
supplied the more advanced mother country with cheap raw 
materials and merchandise that did not compete with the 
homeland's products. The colony provided an outlet for the 
mother country's products. Neomercantilism was, of course, 
specifically designed to advance the economic well-being of 
the mother country; the interests of the colony were always 
subordinate. French economic control of its Southeast Asian 
1 Bert Cooper, John Killigrew, and Norman Lacharite, Case 
Studies In Insurgency And Revolutionary Warfare: Vietnam 1941-
1954 (Washington [D.C.]: Special Operations Research Office, 
The American University, 1964), 17. [Henceforth, Cooper] The 
authors quote from "Colonial Policy," Encyclopedia of Social 
Sciences (New York: Macmillan Company, 1957), 649. 
3 
empire was administered thr9ugh the Bank of Indochina which, 
with its Paris headquarters, controlled all financing and 
investment of the Indochinese economy. High interest rates 
on loans to the Vietnamese led many peasants into a cycle of 
perpetual indebtedness. As an American study put it, 
It was French policy to hinder Vietnamese business 
through petty restrictions and prohibitive taxation. 
Vietnamese businessmen were forced to pay higher taxes 
than those paid by French entrepreneurs in the same 
business; banking rates and interest as well as 
business licenses and fees were higher for the 
Vietnamese. 2
The French also monopolized the production of salt, alcohol, 
and opium in Vietnam, expropriating what had earlier been 
native Vietnamese products. Income from the sale of these 
three made up a substantial part of the colony's general 
budget. French business ventures controlled rice 
production. They developed rubber plantations and 
established mining and textile industries. The French had 
no concern, however, for the long-term development of 
Indochina. Consequently, earnings from their various 
Indochinese investments were not reinvested in the country. 
The French controlled all levels of government 
in Vietnam. The Paris government appointed a Governor 
General for a five year term. He administered all five 
regions of Indochina. These five regions were known as 
Tonkin (northern Vietnam, sometimes referred to as 
Bae Bo), Annam (middle Vietnam), Cochinchina (southern 
2 Ibid, 18. 
4 
Vietnam, sometimes called Nam Bo), Laos, and Cambodia. 
Because of the volatility of French parliamentary politics, 
colonial governors rarely served out their whole terms of 
office. For example, between 1892 and 1930 Indochina had 
a total of twenty-three governors general.3 The 
governor general appointed advisory bodies that had no 
legislative powers and were only consulted on budgetary 
matters. Vietnamese representation in the colonial 
administration, in those rare cases where it existed at all, 
was of minimal political significance.4
In light of the French strangle hold on Vietnam, it is 
not surprising that Roosevelt was a staunch anti-colonialist 
in his Southeast Asian policy. Cordell Hull noted in 1948 
that the President had "entertained strong views on 
independence for French Indo-China. 115 As early as January
1943, the President had "grave doubts" that Indochina should 
be returned to France because he was convinced that France 
had relinquished its world power status.6 Referring to the 
evils of colonialism, Roosevelt told his son, Elliott, 
during the January 1943 Casablanca Conference, "Don't think 
3 Ibid., 43. 
4 Ibid., 40. 
5 Cordell Hull, The Memoirs of Cordell Hull (New York: 
Macmillan, 1948), 1595. [Henceforth, Hull] 
6 "Joint Chiefs of Staff Minutes of a Meeting at the White 
House," January 7, 1943, Foreign Relations of the United States. 
The Conferences at Washington, 1941-1942, and Casablanca, 1943 
(Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1968), 514. 
5 
for a moment • . • that Americans would be dying in the 
Pacific tonight, if it hadn't been for the shortsighted 
greed of the French and the British and the Dutch. 117 
Roosevelt had no love for France and on November 28, 1943, 
he told Stalin that "after 100 years of French rule in 
Indochina, the inhabitants were worse off than they had been 
before. 118 Stalin concurred, and according to Gardner, "he 
did not propose to shed Allied blood to restore French 
rule. 119 On January 3, 1944, Roosevelt reiterated these 
sentiments to the British ambassador to the United States, 
Edward F. L. Wood, 1st earl of Halifax, telling him 
quite frankly that it was perfectly true that I had, 
for over a year, expressed the opinion that Indo-China 
should not go back to France but that it should be 
administered by an international trusteeship. France 
has had the country - thirty million inhabitants - for 
nearly one hundred years, and the people are worse off 
than they were at the beginning • . • .  France has 
milked it for one hundred years. The people of Indo­
china are entitled to something better than that. 10 
Even the Japanese, who occupied Indochina in 1940, had 
a low opinion of French rule there. Japan's Minister of 
Foreign Affairs, Shigemitsu Mamoru, wrote that 
7 Elliott Roosevelt, As He Saw It (New York: Duell, Sloan 
and Pearce, 1946), 115. 
8 "Minutes of Roosevelt-Stalin Meeting," November 28, 1943, 
Foreign Relations of the United States. The Conferences at Cairo 
and Teheran 1943 (Washington, D. c.: GPO, 1961), 485. 
[Henceforth, FRUS - Cairo and Teheran] 
9 Lloyd c. Gardner, Approaching Vietnam: From World War II 
through Dienbienphu, 1941-1954 (New York: Norton, 1988), 39. 
10 Hull, 1597. 
6 
French colonial policy was far more reactionary 
than that of Britain and the U.S. From the time France 
had conquered Annam and Cambodia and made them into 
French colonies, her policy had been one of 
exploitation. Independence movements were ruthlessly 
crushed and the political freedom of the people taken 
away from them.11 
Roosevelt strongly felt that, after the war, Indochina 
should be placed under international trusteeship and receive 
full independence as soon as possible. 12 
Less than two months before his death, Roosevelt was 
still adamantly opposed to allowing the French hold on 
Indochina to continue. He did not like or trust Charles de 
Gaulle. Roosevelt was disinclined to recognize French 
authority or to help them in any way in restore their 
position in Indochina. At a press conference held on 
February 23, 1945, he expressed his concerns about postwar 
Indochina and his hope to establish a trusteeship there. He 
noted that 
Stalin liked the idea. China liked the idea. The 
British don't like it. It might bust up their empire, 
because if the Indo-Chinese were to work together and 
eventually get their independence, the Burmese might do 
the same thing to England.13
Unfortunately for Indochinese independence, Roosevelt 
11 Mamoru Shigemitsu, Japan And Her Destiny: My Struggle For 
Peace, translated by Oswald White (New York: Dutton, 1958), 209. 
[Henceforth, Shigemitsu] 
12 Hull, 1595. 
13 Samuel I Rosenman, compiler, The Public Papers and
Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt, 1944-45 Volume, Victory and 
the Threshold of Peace. With special material and explanatory 
notes (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1950), 562-563. 
7 
died on April 12, 1945, and his successor, Harry s. Truman, 
had a more tolerant view of French ambitions. He ignored 
Roosevelt's wishes and supported the French as they sought 
to regain possession of their colony after the end of the 
war. Truman told de Gaulle that "my government offers no 
opposition to the return of the French Army and authority in 
Indochina.nu
Truman's decision to follow a hands-off policy was 
based on the fact that the central concern of American 
postwar planning was European political and economic 
recovery. Europe, with its highly developed industrial 
base, had the capability to absorb and use American aid. 
American diplomats viewed Southeast Asia as a poor target 
for aid as it 
was mainly agrarian and seemed almost helplessly 
backward. Furthermore, Asia was in the throes of 
nationalist upheavals. The colonial empires were 
disintegrating and anti-Western sentiment was 
widespread.u 
This Europe-first policy grew out of America's 
military decision during World War II that Europe was 
the decisive theater of world conflict, and that Germany had 
14 Charles de Gaulle, The War Memoirs of Charles de Gaulle: 
Salvation, 1944 - 1946, translated by Richard Howard (New York: 
Simon & Schuster, 1960), 242. [Henceforth, de Gaulle - Salvation] 
15 Edward R. Drachman, United states Policy Toward Vietnam, 
1940-1945 (Teaneck (NJ): Fairleigh Dickinson University Press, 
1970), 115. [Henceforth, Drachman) 
8 
to be defeated first before Japan was beaten.16 General 
Joseph W. Stilwell, the commander of U.S. forces in the 
China-Burma-India Theatre, considered southeast Asia to be a 
"Pauper's Theater" due to the low level of military support 
and political concern it received.IT Asia in general was a 
low priority. Therefore, it was not surprising that the 
State Department gave Vietnam a low priority after the war. 
The Department issued a Policy statement concerning 
Indochina on September 27, 1948, setting forth the dilemma 
that the Department faced over taking a firm stand about 
Vietnam. 
Our greatest difficulty in talking with the 
French . . • has been our inability to suggest any 
practicable solution of the Indochina problem, as we 
are all too well aware of the unpleasant fact that 
Communist Ho Chi Minh is the strongest and perhaps the 
ablest figure in Indochina and that any suggested 
solution which excludes him is an expedient of 
uncertain outcome • . •  [yet] we have an immediate 
interest in maintaining in power a friendly French 
government, to assist in the furtherance of our aims in 
Europe. This immediate and vital interest has in 
consequence taken precedence over active steps looking 
toward the realization of our objectives in 
Indochina. 18 
16 Maurice Matloff, strategic Planning For Coalition Warfare, 
1943-44. Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of 
the Army (Washington: GPO, 1959), 9; and Louis Morton, "Germany 
First: The Basic Concept of Allied Strategy in World War II," in 
Command Decisions, edited by Kent R. Greenfield, Office of the 
Chief of Military History, Department of the Army (Washington: 
GPO, 1960), 11. 
17 Joseph W. Stilwell, The Stilwell Papers, edited by 
Theodore H. White (New York: Sloane, 1948), 155. 
18 u. s. Department of Defense, United States - Vietnam
Relations: 1945-1967, Book VIII (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1971), 
148-149. Italics mine. [Henceforth, U.S. - Vietnam Relations]
After the war, the French Communist Party made 
alarming gains. Since Truman did not want to see the 
Communists come into power, he supported de Gaulle. Also, 
the French needed massive American financial aid to rebuild 
their fighting forces in Europe. So Truman instructed his 
Secr.etary of State, Edward R. Stettinius Jr., to talk with 
the French ambassador at the San Francisco Conference. 
Stettinius, in speaking with Ambassador Georges Bidault, 
made it clear to Bidault that the U.S. government did not 
question French sovereignty over Indo-China. 19
Furthermore, in the early 1950s American policy 
makers solicited increased French participation in the 
Atlantic Alliance as well as French approval of German 
rearmament. Because they wanted France to endorse the 
treaty establishing the European Defense Community [EDC], 
American officials avoided actions that would incur the 
wrath of the French National Assembly. 20 
America's pursuit of the Europe-first policy in the 
postwar era, meant that emerging nationalist struggles in 
the rest of the world, for the most part, were overlooked. 
Following the Communist victory in China in 1949 and the 
19 "Telegram - The Acting Secretary of State to the 
Ambassador in France (Caffery)," May 9, 1945, Foreign Relations 
of the United states: The British Commonwealth and the Far East, 
1945. Vol. 6. (Washington, o.c.: GPO, 1969), 307. [Henceforth, 
FRUS - British] 
20 Marianna P. Sullivan, France's Vietnam Policy (Westport 
[CT]: Greenwood Press, 1978), 43. [Henceforth, Sullivan] 
9 
10 
outbreak of the Korean War in 1950, American policy became 
more preoccupied with the Communist threat. When a 
nationalist movement became powerful, as in Vietnam, it was 
often misread as being primarily, or even entirely 
Communistic. This misinterpretation became the foundation 
for·America's tragic involvement in Vietnam. 
In most respects Vietnamese nationalism was a reaction 
to French colonial oppression. However, its catalyst was 
the Japanese occupation of Indochina in 1940 which shattered 
the mystique of white supremacy in Asia. 
marched boldly into Southeast Asia as 
The Japanese army 
the champion of 
anti-colonialism and national liberation, and its military 
strength broke the European hold on the Far East. It is to 
this episode in Vietnamese history that we now turn. 
CHAPTER II 
JAPANESE INVOLVEMENT IN INDOCHINA 
The French controlled their colony in Indochina with a 
commercial and official population of no more than 42,000, 
and this number included all of the wives and children. 
They represented less than 0.2% of the total population.1 
Approximately 90,000 French army soldiers were stationed in 
Indochina to keep order and enforce French rule, but most of 
these were natives or colonials. Therefore, the French 
occupiers constituted a very thin and fragile stratum. When 
France fell to Germany in June 1940, and the Vichy 
regime friendly to Hitler was established, there was no 
political or ideological reason left to restrain Japanese 
ambitions in the region. 
Japan's involvement in Indochina began with its 
ambitions in China. It defeated the Peiyang forces of the 
Ch'ing in 1894-95 and secured a foothold in Manchuria after 
the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-05. It attempted to encroach 
on North China through Shantung during World War I. The 
Japanese army, an increasingly independent force within the 
Japanese state, greatly feared the growing Nationalist 
1 John T. McAlister, Jr. Viet Nam: The Origins of Revolution 
(New York: Knopf, 1969), 102; he quotes from Annuaire Statistique 
de l'Indochine, 1936-1937, 25. (Henceforth, McAlisterJ; Chieu Ngu 
Vu, "Political and Social Change in Vietnam between 1940 and 
194611 (Ph.D diss., University of Wisconsin-Madison, [WI], 1984), 
67. [Henceforth, Vu)
11 
12 
movement of the Kuomintang (KMT) under Chiang Kai-shek in 
the late 1920s. After the Mukden Incident of September 18, 
1931, staged by young Japanese army officers, Japan quickly 
occupied Manchuria and established the Japanese-dominated 
state of Manchukuo. By the winter of 1933 the Japanese army 
moved into northern China and occupied Ch'engte (Jehol), 
approximately 100 miles northeast of Beijing. In 1935 
they got Chiang to agree to withdraw his troops from the 
Beijing area and began to set up a puppet state in northern 
China. After the Marco Polo Bridge Incident on July 7, 
1937, outside of Beijing, the Japanese army launched a full 
scale invasion of China and quickly took over Nanking, 
Hankow, and Canton. 2
The Japanese began to take a serious interest in 
Vietnam in the late 1930s because one of Chiang's major 
supply routes originated at the Vietnamese port of Haiphong, 
approximately 55 miles east of Hanoi. Consequently, they 
began to collect and codify information pertaining to 
Vietnam's culture, economy, history, and geography as 
rapidly as possible. 3 After the fall of Nanking in 1937, 
and Hankow and Canton the following year, Japanese direct 
2 Edwin o. Reischauer and Albert M. Craig, Japan (Boston: 
Houghton Mifflin Company, 1989), 249-257. (Henceforth, 
Reischauer] 
3 David G. Marr, "World War II and the Vietnamese 
Revolution," in Southeast Asia Under Japanese Occupation, edited 
by Alfred w. McCoy (New Haven (CT]: Yale University Southeast 
Asia Studies [Monograph Series No. 22], 1980), 132. [Henceforth, 
Marr] 
13 
involvement in Vietnamese affairs grew because they realized 
they had to cut off the flow of supplies to Chiang's KMT 
forces located in Yilnnan. 
Chiang relied increasingly upon war materials being 
transported via three main supply routes. One was the Burma 
Roac:i, and another was the "red road" from the Ulan Ude near 
Lake Baikal in Soviet Union to Ulan Bator in Mongolia. The 
third, and most important route, was the Tonkin Railroad 
from Haiphong to Yilnnan. 4 Supplies obtained from Britain, 
France, the Soviet Union, the United States and 
other countries permitted Chiang's government to continue 
its resistance to Japan after it had withdrawn to Szechwan 
province and lost most of its cities and industrial 
centers. 5
On June 19, 1940, the day after Marshall Georges Petain 
asked Germany for an armistice, the Japanese handed an 
ultimatum to General Georges Catroux, the Governor General 
of French Indochina. It contained two provisions. First, 
the Tonkin-Chinese frontier was to be closed to the export 
of trucks, gasoline, and a number of other war 
materials. Second, Catroux was to admit a Japanese 
4 Joseph Buttinger, Vietnam: A Dragon Embattled (New York: 
Praeger, 1967), 228. [Henceforth, Buttinger] 
5 Hata Ikuhiko, "The Army's Move into Northern Indochina," 
translated by Robert A. Scalapino in The Fateful Choice: Japan's 
Advance into Southeast Asia, 1939-1941, edited by James William 
Morley (New York: Columbia University Press, 1980) 155-208. 
[Henceforth, Hata] 
14 
military control commission into Tonkin that would supervise 
not only the suspension of all aid to China but also the 
implementation of the agreement. 6 catroux, who was only 
given twenty-four hours to reply, accepted the ultimatum on 
June 20, 1940 with the proviso that the Japanese commission 
operate in a reserved manner. 7 The French immediately 
closed the Tonkin-Chinese border. Chiang could no longer 
receive supplies and materiel via the port of Haiphong. By 
the beginning of July, General Nishihara Issaku had 
established several control stations along Tonkin's highways 
and railroads to interdict the flow of materiel to Yilnnan. 
Over 100,000 tons of Chinese supplies, including 400 tons of 
medical supplies and more than a thousand trucks, valued at 
$6-8,000,000, were caught at Haiphong by this action. 8 
The Petain-Darlan Government, on its knees before 
Hitler, surprisingly disapproved of catroux's decision to 
capitulate to the Japanese. It relieved him because he had 
failed to consult them, although on June 20, just two days 
after Petain had asked for an armistice, the French 
government had issued a directive dealing with the loss of 
communication between France and its overseas territories. 
6 Buttinger, 235; John E. Dreifort, "Japan's Advance into 
Indochina, 1940: The French Response," Journal of Southeast Asian 
Studies 13 (September 1982): 280. [Henceforth, Dreifort] 
7 Georges catroux, Deux Actes du Drame Indochinois (Paris: 
Librairie Plon, 1959), 61. 
8 Buttinger, 574 n. 10. 
15 
It gave colonial officials broad powers that might be 
necessary to deal with important policy matters which would 
normally be handled in Paris. 9 It was virtually 
impossible for Catroux to communicate with his superiors 
at that particular time anyway because the French 
administration was in a chaotic state as it fled south from 
Paris to Vichy. 
Vice Admiral Jean Decoux assumed command in Indochina 
on· July 20, 1940. The Petain Government ordered Decoux to 
negotiate a treaty with Japan. Despite some foot-dragging 
that irked the Japanese, Decoux concluded an agreement with 
Nishihara on September 22, 1940, that allowed the Japanese 
to occupy certain key sites in Tonkin. The Japanese also 
got transit rights and the use of airfields in northern 
Tonkin. They were allowed to station 6,000 men north of the 
Red River, but not more than 25,000 in the whole of 
Indochina. 10 
The Japanese army authorities in China were still 
not satisfied, however, and decided to speed the way for 
future concessions by force. On the same day as the Decoux­
Nishihara agreement, September 22, the Japanese Army in 
southern China, under General Nakamura Aketo, feigned 
ignorance of the treaty, crossed the border, and attacked 
French garrisons at Dong Dang and Lang Son, approximately 90 
9 Dreifort, 282. 
10 Buttinger, 236. 
16 
miles northeast of Hanoi. The French resisted stiffly, 
killing some 800 Japanese, but Dong Dang fell within twenty­
four hours and Lang Son fell the next day. The combat 
ceased only after the Emperor issued a personal order to the 
troops to stop fighting.11 The Japanese government later 
apo_logized for this action and Nishihara called it a 
"dreadful mistake." Japan's Minister of Foreign Affairs, 
Shigemitsu Mamoru, later characterized the incident as 
follows: 
• the Army was guilty of disgraceful behavior. The
entry of troops was to have been a peaceful manoeuvre 
but the plan was upset by the intrigues of the senior 
staff officers. Staff officers of the occupying 
troops, with the connivance of the Army chiefs in 
Tokyo, carried out the entry as though it was an 
occupation by force of arms, and proceeded to control 
the territory in the manner that had become second 
nature to them. The fact was the officers were 
dissatisfied with the attitude of moderation shown by 
Nishihara in the negotiations, and, therefore, just 
ignored them. 12
But the Japanese army had made its point, and the French 
were put on notice to forego any plans for future resistance 
to the Japanese occupation. 13 One reason for this incident 
can also be traced to problems within the Japanese army and 
its lax military discipline. The army suffered from the 
tendency of junior officers to ignore or dominate their 
11 Dreifort, 294. 
12 Shigemitsu, 207. 
13 Bernard B. Fall, street Without Joy (New York: Schocken 
Books, 1972), 24. (Henceforth, Fall - Street) 
17 
seniors in the decision making process." Hata has 
characterized this problem as a disease that infected the 
Japanese army and was "so widespread that the death of the 
Japanese empire was inevitable. 1115 
The agreement between Japan and the Vichy regime 
in Indochina made that area of the world somewhat of an 
anomaly in the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. 
After all the propaganda touting "Asia for the Asiatics" and 
the end of the white man's domination, French Indochina 
stood as a bastion of Western imperialism protected by the 
"liberators of Asia." This was not encouraging to 
nationalist aspirations elsewhere in Asia.M The Japanese 
really had little choice, however, because their removal of 
the French would have created chaos to Indochina's 
government and the economy. In turn this would have slowed 
their time-table of expansion into Southeast Asia and 
precipitated a drain on Japan's technical and 
administrative staff which she could ill afford. 17 Japan 
needed a peaceful Indochina as a secure base of operations 
14 For a fuller discussion of this phenomenon see Masao 
Maruyama, Thought and Behaviour in Modern Japanese Politics, 
edited by Ivan Morris (New York: Oxford University Press, 1969), 
109-115, and 382 "Rule of the higher by the lower (gekokuj6)."
15 Hata, 207. 
16 Willard H. Elsbree, Japan's Role In Southeast Asia 
Nationalist Movements (Cambridge [MAJ: Harvard University Press, 
1953), 23. [Henceforth, Elsbree) 
17 Ibid., 24.
18 
and staging area for its expected invasion of Malaya. Thus, 
the extent of Japanese control over each country in 
the Co-Prosperity Sphere was anticipated to vary "but proper 
and suitable forms of government shall be decided for them 
in consideration of military and economic requirements and 
of �he historical, political and cultural elements 
particular to each area," according to a Japanese plan for 
the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere.18 
The United States was upset at this turn of events, 
even though the Vichy regime really had no alternative but 
to conclude an agreement with the Japanese. Roosevelt 
thought this French collaboration with Japan was 
inexcusable. On October 16, 1940, the United States 
responded by placing an embargo on sale of steel and scrap 
iron to Japan. 19
In reality the Japanese advance into Tonkin was only a 
pretext to occupy the entire country. According to a "Very 
Secret" document entitled "Outline of Japanese Foreign 
Policy," dated September 28, 1940, it was Japan's objective 
18 R. John Pritchard and Sonia Magbanua Zaide, eds., The
Tokyo War Crimes Trial - Transcript of the Proceedings in Open 
Session, Vol. 5: Pages 9,818 - 12,392 [a/k/a International 
Military Tribunal Far East - IMTFE] (New York: Garland Publishing 
Inc., 1981), Exhibit 1336: "Secret - Draft of Basic Plan for 
Establishment of Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere," by 
Total War Research Institute, dated January 27, 1942; Chapter 3 
(Political Construction) (1) Basic Plan - Paragraph 2 (b): 
12,014. [Henceforth, IMTFE, E(xhibit)#, Document title, & Page #] 
19 William L. Langer, editor, An Encyclopedia of World 
History (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1972), 1152. 
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to penetrate the southern regions with the aim of 
controlling settled areas during a first stage and then "we 
should gradually advance into the other areas. . steps 
shall be devised to enable Japan to hold strategic points in 
every area1120 Japan expected to force French Indochina to 
cooperate in establishing a "New Order for East Asia," and 
to participate with them in "settling the China incident, 
but to also have her support the Empire in both military and 
economical lines . [and] accede to the Empire's demands 
forming the contents of the political and military agreement 
and economical agreement. 1121 Consequently, Indochina would 
serve as a base from which the Japanese could strike 
other Far Eastern colonies that were held by the Western 
colonial powers - the East Indies, Malaya, Burma, and the 
Philippines. 22
Soon after their troops were permitted into northern 
Vietnam, the Japanese expropriated all Chinese businesses in 
20 IMTFE, E628: "JAPANESE FOREIGN POLICY - VERY SECRET, 11
dated September 28, 1940; unnumbered sub-paragraph entitled 
"Tentative Plan for Policy towards the Southern Regions," dated 
October 4, 1940: 6,977-6,978. This is a statement of Japanese 
Foreign Policy obtained from the Japanese Foreign Ministry. 
n IMTFE, E620: "The circumstances surrounding the conclusion 
of agreement between Japan and France concerning the advancement 
of the Japanese Army into French Indo-China, 11 dated July -
September 1940: 6,880. 
22 Dreifort, 279; Rima Rathausky, ed., Documents of the 
August 1945 Revolution in Vietnam, translated by C. Kiriloff 
(Canberra [Australia]: Department of International Relations, 
Research School of Pacific studies, The Australian National 
University, 1963), iii. [Henceforth, Documents/August Revolution] 
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Tonkin that were active in trading with Yunnan. This step 
further solidified their hold on the region. In mid 1941 
the Japanese exacted the right to occupy Cochinchina after 
settling a border dispute between Thailand and Indochina, 
and troops entered the area on July 29. Indochina and 
Thailand were important to Japan because rubber, coal, 
iron ore, tungsten, manganese, antimony, tin, and other rare 
minerals from these regions were indispensable to the 
Japanese economy.n Thus, Japanese dependence upon Western 
sources for these strategic raw materials would be 
significantly decreased. The Japanese also wanted to 
control the rice and other food supplies produced in the 
deltas of the Mekong and Red Rivers.u Finally, zinc and 
coffee were also available in modest amounts. 
On August 1 the United States retaliated with a full­
scale embargo. Roosevelt's Executive Order prohibited the 
export of materials like wood pulp, metals, chemicals and 
related products and, most importantly, petroleum products 
especially those which could be refined into aviation 
fuel.25 It froze the assets of Japanese firms doing 
l n Kiyoko Kurusu Nitz, "Japanese Military Policy towards
!French Indochina during the Second World War: The Road to the
Meigo Sakusen (9 March 1945)," Journal of Southeast Asian Studies
;14 (September 1983): 331-332. [Henceforth, Nitz]; Buttinger, 232.
u Dreifort, 279.l
I 25 Sachiko Murakami, "Japan's Thrust into French Indochina:1
1940 - 1945" (Ph.D. diss., New York University, 1981), 339.
j[Henceforth, Murakami]
i
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business in the U.S. so that as Shigemitsu put it, 
trade between Japan and the U.S. came to a standstill; 
economic warfare had grown to full scale. Britain and 
the Netherlands took similar steps. Trade, the life­
blood of 80 million Japanese, was now lost save in the 
occupied territories. Economically the U.S. had within 
her grasp the power to strangle Japan.26
Thus, the move into French Indochina had placed Japan in a 
more precarious position than before. But the Japanese 
occupation of the area was secure. In fact, the oil in the 
Dutch East Indies was one of the main reasons for the 
Japanese drive to secure a base in Indochina. Faced with 
the embargo, the Japanese knew that without access to those 
oil fields, their navy would be immobilized, and without the 
navy the growth and existence of the Empire would be in 
peril.v 
For reasons of political convenience, the Japanese left 
the administration of Indochina to the French. Generally, 
they made no attempt to influence directly the domestic 
politics of Indochina. The French administration functioned 
much as it had before the Japanese occupation. They were 
allowed to maintain their army as long as they agreed not 
to interfere with Japanese military operations.u 
Consequently, France salvaged a modicum of honor and 
� Shigemitsu, 241. 
v Peter M. Dunn, The First Vietnam War (New York: st. 
Martin's Press, 1985), 59. [Henceforth, Dunn] 
28 R. Harris Smith, oss: The Secret History of America's
First Central Intelligence Agency (Berkeley [CA]: University of 
California Press, 1972), 320. [Henceforth, R. H. Smith] 
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colonial power. 
Despite the presence of more than 90,000 French troops 
in Indochina, Japan was able to acquire a strategic base in 
the area at practically no military cost and to seal off 
China's southern border. Vietnam's air bases were available 
for use against China and Southeast Asian countries. Japan 
had virtually unhampered use of Vietnam's ports and harbors 
for shipping raw materials, military supplies, and 
manpower between Japan and Southeast Asia. The Japanese 
also had total control over Indochina's raw materials and 
crops.29
Japan's advance into Indochina was, as noted, an 
important stimulant to Asian nationalism. When the Japanese 
took Singapore on February 15, 1942, European 
colonial dominance in Asia was shattered. Singapore's 
capitulation inspired nationalists in Southeast Asia to seek 
their independence because the continuity of foreign power 
had been broken by fellow Asians. Boettcher noted that "The 
Vietnamese in particular were encouraged."m 
29 Chester L. Cooper, The Lost Crusade: America in Vietnam
(New York: Dodd Mead & Company, 1970), 21. 
30 Thomas D. Boettcher, Vietnam: The Valor and the Sorrow
(Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1985), 36. (Henceforth, 
Boettcher] 
CHAPTER III 
THE JAPANESE COUP OF MARCH 9, 1945 
Beginning in December 1941 the Japanese launched their 
invasion of Malaya, the East Indies, and Burma, and their 
occupation of Vietnam during these operations was an 
imp�rtant strategic advantage. Following these 
offensives, the Japanese occupation of Indochina was quiet 
and uneventful until 1944. In that year, however, the 
growing strength of U.S. forces in the Pacific worried the 
Japanese military planners who held responsibility for 
Vietnam. The U.S., having invaded Leyte and destroyed most 
of the Japanese Navy in October 1944, was in a 
position to disrupt communications between Japanese 
forces in Indochina and Tokyo. An Allied sea-borne 
invasion of Vietnam was feasible as Southeast Asia became 
more and more isolated from mainland Japan. Japanese army 
staff officers expected the U.S. to launch an invasion of 
Indochina.1 After the fall of Manila on February 5, 
however, the Allies decided to advance northward from the 
Philippines bypassing Indochina. When the Allies reopened 
the Burmese route to Chungking in January 1945, however, the 
Japanese were forced to strengthen their defenses along the 
northern border of Vietnam in anticipation of an attack from 
j 
1 Nitz, 335; Ralph B. Smith, "The Japanese Period in
Indochina and the Coup of 9 March 1945," Journal of Southeast 
Asian studies 9 (September 1978): 278. [Henceforth, R. B. Smith] 
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that quarter. This deployment reduced the number of men in 
central Indochina by half and exposed Vietnam to more 
American air raids from General Claire L. Chennault's 
Fourteenth Air Force. 2 
American bombing attacks, which were conducted with 
increasing frequency after 1944, damaged much of Vietnam's 
transportation system. The railroad system was destroyed, 
and the Mandarin Road, which connected Vietnam's three 
regions, was virtually obliterated. American submarines not 
only torpedoed Indochina's coastal shipping but also mined 
the entrances to many harbors. By early 1945 aircraft 
carriers arrived offshore and regularly attacked targets of 
opportunity throughout Vietnam.3 Adding to the Japanese 
sense of urgency were worsening conditions of food supply 
for the general population. Harvests had been poor and U.S. 
attacks brought to a standstill the land and ocean shipment 
of goods (most particularly rice) from Cochinchina to 
Tonkin. These developments had grievous consequences for 
the Vietnamese in Tonkin. It led to a major famine during 
1944-45 in which between one and a half and two million 
Vietnamese starved to death because of exceptionally poor 
harvests.4
2 Nitz, 336. 
3 Marr, 135. 
4 Ngo Vinh Long, Before the Revolution: The Vietnamese 
Peasants Under the French (Cambridge [MA]: The Massachusetts 
Institute of Technology Press, 1973), 130; he translates an 
25 
In the fall of 1944, following the Allied reconquest of 
France, de Gaulle and his government in exile returned to 
Paris from Algiers to establish a new provisional regime. 
Since the Japanese had originally negotiated agreements with 
Vichy, they knew that de Gaulle's eclipse of that government 
boded ill for their position in Indochina. 
Given these circumstances, it is no wonder that the 
French in Indochina were becoming restless. French 
resistance to the Japanese occupation became more organized 
and overt during the fall of 1944. In September portraits 
of Petain and Vichy Government slogans were removed from 
public places.5 Decoux became more reluctant to supply rice 
to the Japanese. In Hanoi contempt was shown toward the 
Japanese flag. Small acts of sabotage, such as the wrecking 
of Japanese army transport trucks, began to occur. There 
were boycotts of Japanese businesses. Pro-Japanese 
Vietnamese were coerced or arrested in growing numbers. The 
Japanese also noted that French anti-aircraft units stopped 
eyewitness account of the famine by Tran Van Mai, entitled "Who 
Committed This Crime?" (Henceforth, Long]; Admiral (Jean] Decoux, 
Ai La Barre de L'Indochine: Histoire de mon Gouvernement General,
1940-1945 (Paris: Librairie Plon, 1952), 267. [Henceforth, 
Decoux] Decoux would later write that U.S. bombing destroyed 
maritime lines of communication and practically halted the 
shipment of cereals from the south to the north. Although Decoux 
spoke in terms of one million dead, the real figure is probably 
closer to two million. Newspaper reports at the time used the 
higher figure and are generally accepted by the Vietnamese as 
being more accurate. 
5 Nitz, 336; quoting from Shizue Maruyama, Ushinawareta
Kiroku [A Lost Record] (Tokyo: Koraku-shobo, 1950), 276. 
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shooting at American bombers on raids.6 The French refused 
to surrender downed American pilots, became more vociferous 
in their condemnation of Japanese rule, and made it no 
secret that they would attack the Japanese after the Allied 
landings began.7 These acts caused the Japanese to be 
concerned about their security. They also felt that, even 
if the landings did not take place, the French still might 
take their revenge. 
In his memoirs de Gaulle mentions that he had managed 
to persuade the British government and Lord Louis 
Mountbatten, British commander in chief in the Indian Ocean, 
to grant the French permission to establish a base at New 
Delhi, under the command of Lieutenant General Roger c.
Blaizot, whose principal mission was to prepare for 
Indochina's recapture.8 De Gaulle also stated that several 
French authorities in Indochina, including General Eugene 
Mordant, had contacted him in Algiers about resistance work 
prior to 1945, but he was unable to give them much support 
or encouragement until France was liberated.9 Thus, there 
6 Ibid., 337. 
7 Archimedes L. A. Patti, Why Vietnam? Prelude to America's
Albatross (Berkeley [CA]: University of California Press, 1980), 
j41. [Henceforth, Patti] 
; 
8 Charles de Gaulle, The Complete War Memoirs of Charles de
:Gaulle, translated by Jonathan Griffin and Richard Howard (New 
York: Simon & Schuster, 1964), 626. [Henceforth de Gaulle -
Memoirs] 
9 Ibid., 625. 
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were few anti-Japanese activities in Vietnam until the fall 
of 1944.
In July 1944, however, the commander of French forces 
in Indochina, General Mordant, was contacted by a French 
officer working with British Force 136 in India, the Asian 
ar� of the British Special Operations Executive (SOE - the 
British counterpart to the OSS). In an operation code 
named BELIEF I, Major Fran9ois de Langlade was parachuted 
into Tonkin during the night of July 6 near Lang Son and 
made contact with Mordant in Hanoi.10 He delivered highly 
classified instructions from de Gaulle which asked Mordant 
to form a government-backed resistance movement in Vietnam. 
This movement would be controlled from outside Indochina and 
would mainly be involved in sabotaging shipping facilities 
in Indochinese ports.11 Mordant agreed and, without 
informing Decoux of his new plans, requested to retire on 
the grounds of age. Decoux approved and replaced him with 
General Ayme. On September 10, de Gaulle formally appointed 
Mordant to head the Resistance.u 
Mordant and his superiors in Paris decided to remove 
French army forces from the cities so that they could not be 
bottled up when the time came to strike against the 
10 Philippe Devillers, Histoire Du Viet-Nam de 1940 a 1952
(Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1952), 118. [Henceforth, Devillers] 
11 Patti, 30. 
u Patti, 37-39; R. B. Smith, 277.
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Japanese. He began to train his troops for night operations 
and mountain warfare. Mordant, unfortunately, was 
apparently not adept at concealing the French movements from 
the Japanese. Therefore, it was not long before everyone, 
including the Japanese, knew what he was doing . 13 Also, 
Mordant was seriously hampered by suspicions that the French 
in Vietnam harbored for de Gaulle's Free French. Many older 
colonists hesitated to cooperate with Mordant's organization 
because they not only feared that Decoux's informants had 
infiltrated it but also that their careers and positions 
would be compromised. 14 
In the meantime Ayme had informed Decoux about the 
existence of Mordant' s organization. 15 Decoux was not happy 
that Mordant had authority in the eyes of Paris while he 
had to continue in his position as Governor. 
Furthermore, he did not like de Gaulle or trust his Free 
French movement, so he cabled Paris and tendered his 
resignation. 16 For his part, de Gaulle distrusted Vichyites 
and refused to work with them. But in this case he was 
forced to order Major Langlade, who in the meantime had 
returned to India, back to Indochina. On his return trip he 
13 Patti, 38. 
14 Cooper, 45. 
15 Decoux, 319. 
16 Patti, 39; R. B. Smith, 277; Vu, 326. 
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landed at Dien Bien Phu, which was under French control, and 
on November 19, 1944, met in Hanoi with Decoux, who then 
reluctantly agreed to become a front man for Mordant•s 
underground." Eventually, in the fall of 1945, Decoux was 
arrested by the French Republic and charged with 
collaboration. He spent almost two years in prison before 
being released because of ill health. He was finally 
cleared in March 1949 .18 
At the end of October 1944, the Southern Region Army 
asked the headquarters of the Indoshina Chutongun (Japanese 
Stationary Forces in Indochina, or JSFI) to draft a plan for 
future military operations against the French Indochinese 
Army. 19 Colonel Hayashi Hidezumi, a member of Lieutenant 
General Machijiri Kazumoto•s staff, apparently drew up the 
original plan. It was completed by the end of December.20
This plan was given the name of Mago Sakusen (Mago Action; 
"Ma" represented the initial of Lieutenant General 
Machijiri) .21 Meanwhile, Machijiri, who had commanded the 
Thirty-eighth Army since 1942, was replaced by Lieutenant 
17 Patti, 39; Ellen J. Hammer, The Struggle For Indochina 
(Stanford (CA): Stanford University Press, 1954), 34. 
[Henceforth, Hammer] 
18 Hammer, 3 o • 
19 Nitz, 335. 
20 R. B. Smith, 282. Evidence cited by Smith tends to 
\suggest that Hidezumi drafted the plan. 
21 Nitz, 335. 
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General Tsuchihashi Yuitsu, so the plan was forwarded 
to him. Tsuchihashi, who had previously been in Timor, 
took command on December 4 . 22 
Upon arriving in Saigon, Tsuchihashi immediately went 
on an inspection tour of the north. He met with Decoux in 
Hanoi and immediately realized that the French had no 
intention of continuing their collaboration with Japan. He 
quickly understood that Decoux assumed Japan's eventual 
defeat and was merely stalling for time. Upon his return to 
Saigon, he decided to strengthen his headquarters 
command and change the code name of the coup to "Meigo" (or 
"Bright" [Moon] Action) • 23 On December 29, 1944, the 
Imperial Headquarters in Tokyo learned that they had lost 
the battle in Leyte, so the Prime Minister, Koiso Kuniaki, 
proposed to the Supreme War Leadership Conference that Japan 
take over Indochina immediately to forestall a U.S. 
landing there. The conference members agreed to put off 
their decision concerning an armed takeover of Vietnam until 
January.24 
Saigon was bombed for the first time on January 9, 1945 
by B-29's from India. On January 11 an American fleet 
appeared in the South China Sea and sank half of a Japanese 
convoy transportating supplies to Japan. American carrier-
n R. B. Smith, 279. 
23 Nitz, 339-40. 
24 Vu, 317. 
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based planes bombed Saigon and other Japanese bases along 
the coast of Annam on January 12 and inflicted heavy losses. 
Saigon's port facilities were badly damaged.25 These
attacks further encouraged the French. The bombing raids 
troubled the Japanese because it "was the first time that 
Indochina had been attacked by planes based on carriers in
the Pacific. "26 They thought the attack was a precursor to 
invasion, especially since American troops had occupied most 
of Luzon Island that same month.27 Prior to that date, the 
only known American pressure on the Japanese had been 
exerted by Chennault's land based Fourteenth Air Force 
which could only bomb as far south as Vinh, 165 miles south 
of Hanoi. Also, in January 1945, the SOE started dropping 
military supplies to the French in Indochina. The French 
unwisely placed these arms in their regular regimental 
arsenals in full view of the Japanese.3
On their side the Japanese were not idle. They made 
regular use of radio intercepts and undercover agents to 
discover Gaullist activity. Thus, Japanese intelligence was 
well aware of the French preparations for resistance and 
began to have concerns about the safety of Japanese troops 
25 Ibid., 311. 
26 R. B. Smith, 278. 
27 Hammer, 38.
28 R. H. Smith, 326.
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stationed in Indochina. 29
Leaving on January 21 for an inspection tour of all 
Japanese units in the country, Tsuchihashi directed his 
staff to prepare tactical plans for neutralizing French 
power while he was away although the high command had not 
yet: made a final decision. He "planned to keep the existing 
administrative system as well as personnel, although 
Japanese diplomats would be appointed to the key posts. 1130
The Supreme War Leadership Conference members agreed on 
February 1 that 
In view of the change in the war situation and the 
attitude of French Indo-China, the Japanese Empire, 
based on the absolute need of self-existence and self­
defence, shall resort to timely independent military 
action. The time for resorting to military measures 
shall be determined separately. 31
The Japanese Imperial Headquarters issued an order 
authorizing the coup against the French for the first part 
of March. They decided to give the French only two hours to 
respond to their demands. 32 Even though they might have to 
29 Lieutenant Colonel Sakai Tateki, French Indo-China 
!operations Record: 1940-1945, Japanese Monograph no. 25, (Office
lof the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army,
Washington, D. c., 1952), 22. [Henceforth, Sakai] 
30 Nitz, 340. 
31 IMTFE, E661: "THE SUPREME WAR-LEADERSHIP COUNCIL DECISION 
1No. 16. RE[:] MEASURES TOWARDS FRENCH INDO-CHINA TO MEET THE
iSUDDEN CHANGE IN THE SITUATION," dated February 1, 1945, 
Paragraph I, Sub-Paragraph 1: 7,166. 
32 Murakami, 522; she quotes from an official Japanese 
1:history document by Nihon, Boeicho Senshishitsu (Japan, Defense 
iAgency, Archives of the War History Office), Sittan Meigo Sakusen 
(Sittan and Mei operations), (Tokyo: Asagumo Shimbunsha, 1969), 
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resort to force, the Japanese resolved that Japan would not 
declare war on France. They were also determined to 
"elevate and support" the independence of Vietnam to 
garner the active support of the Vietnamese for their war 
effort.33 Their primary objective in granting independence 
wa5. to make Vietnam cooperate more fully with Japan. In 
turn Japan would supply administrative guidance, disguising 
it as a voluntary independence.� 
On February 20 some French leaders met in Hanoi to 
discuss future military action against the Japanese. The 
Japanese had inside knowledge of this meeting and learned 
that many of those present had "advocated an immediate armed 
attack on Japanese positions."" This caused them even more 
concern for the safety of their forces. Thus, on February 
26, the Supreme War Leader's Conference decided definitely 
to proceed with the coup, and on February 28 the Japanese 
Imperial Headquarters issued the order to carry out the 
Meig6 Operation.� 
In a telegram dated March 3 to Shigemitsu, the Japanese 
ambassador to Vietnam, Matsumoto Shun•ichi, sought 
reassurances from Tokyo that the Cabinet would backup his 
589-90; Sakai, 24.
33 IMTFE, E661: Paragraph II, Sub-paragraph 4 (a): 7,168. 
� Nitz, 342. 
" 'th R. B. Sm1 , 280. 
36 Murakami, 521-22; R. B. Smith, 280; Vu, 332. 
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perilous position. He requested "a complete liaison with 
the military authorities. 11n 
In the meantime, the Japanese were moving more troops 
into Indochina. Most of these came from South China 
and Burma. Earlier in the war the average Japanese troop 
strength in Indochina was about 35,000 men. However, they 
had 61,775 troops stationed there at the end of February, 
1945. 38 The French were aware of these increased troop 
movements, but apparently believed that nothing was going to 
happen to them. Since they continued to control their army, 
the French, in their self-deceptive arrogance, were 
oblivious to the fact that trouble was indeed all they could 
cause the Japanese. While many of them may have considered 
their military to be a reserve force for the Allies, they 
tended to overlook the fact that the Japanese were still in 
control in Indochina. The French were convinced that their 
army was going to do great harm to the Japanese Army before 
the war ended. Buttinger wrote that "With the decline of 
Japanese military power this self-deception increased. 1139 
Their blatant preparations for war, however, forced Japan to 
take action. 
In February 1945, the French began to construct 
 37 IMTFE, E662: Telegram, "TO GREATER EAST ASIA MINISTER 
sHIGEMITSU. FROM AMBASSADOR MATSUMOTO," dated March 3, 1945: 
:1,112. 
� McAlister, 110. 
� Buttinger, 285. 
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defensive positions outside of Saigon, thus telegraphing 
their plans to fight the Japanese. Mordant had advance 
warning of the Japanese preparations for action, but chose 
to ignore it. A Vietnamese police official who was an agent 
of SLFEO (Section de Liaison Fran9aise en Extreme Orient -
Far E�stern French Liaison Section) warned Mordant on March 
8 that the Japanese were planning to neutralize the French 
Army sometime between March 8 and 10. Because the man was a 
civilian, Mordant discounted his story. Civilians tend to 
exaggerate, he believed. More important, the French 
military services had not uncovered any indication of a 
coup.� 
Japanese preparations were completed on the night of 
March 8, 1945. The next morning, Matsumoto informed Admiral 
Decoux that he needed to see him to convey important 
instructions that had just been received from Tokyo. At 
6:00 P.M., Saigon time, Ambassador Matsumoto, along with 
Consul General Kono, visited Decoux. They discussed other 
matters and then, at 7:00 P.M., Matsumoto handed Decoux an 
ultimatum demanding that all French military and police 
forces be placed under the command and control of Japanese 
authorities. The French were also ordered to surrender all 
communications, transportation, banking systems and 
administrative services to the Japanese. Decoux was given 
until 9:00 P.M. that night to reply. The Japanese 
� Patti, 74.
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ambassador also handed Decoux an already prepared note of 
acceptance that specified it had to be returned, 
signed, to Matsumoto by the deadline. Trying to buy time, 
Decoux replied with a note asking for a more thorough 
discussion of the matter and pledged that French troops 
would remain friendly unless attacked. A Captain Robin, 
from the French Navy, who was Commissioner General for 
Japanese-French Relations, was given the task of delivering 
the note. He got lost trying to find the headquarters of 
the 38th Army and did not deliver it until 9:15. The 
Japanese moved to take over the French government at 9:17
P.M. and, shortly afterward controlled Saigon. 41 
The arrest of Decoux and his men was only the first 
step in the March 9 coup. All French military barracks and 
forts throughout Vietnam were simultaneously attacked and 
fell with little resistance, although some 1,700 soldiers 
were killed. 42 Those who surrendered were confined to 
barracks. Some French troops refused to surrender. At 
Lang Son, the Japanese beheaded French General 
Lemonnier and the civilian administrator, Governor c.
Auphelle, under the eyes of the defenders when both men 
refused to call upon the garrison to surrender. 43 Twelve 
thousand men fought for two days before running out of 
41 Sakai, 24; Vu, 334. 
42 Boettcher, 3 9 •
� Fall - street, 25. 
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ammunition and water. Hundreds of survivors surrendered, 
but the Japanese commander, infuriated by the losses that 
the French had inflicted upon his troops, massacred every 
last Frenchman. The troops at Dong Dang suffered the same 
fate. They surrendered after three days to the same 
Japane�e commander who then executed every single man in the 
garrison.M 
French forces in Tonkin under the command of Lieutenant 
General Gabriel Sabattier also put up some resistance. 
Sabattier, who had taken the SLEFO agent's warning 
seriously, declared a practice "state of alert," and left 
Hanoi on March 8 for his field headquarters. Ayme canceled 
the ''alert" on March 9 because he felt it might unduly alarm 
the Japanese. Meanwhile, Sabattier' s action had alerted 
Major General Marcel Alessandri who was at Tong just west of 
Hanoi. He immediately broke camp and moved his troops, 
about 1000 men, to the northwestern mountainous region of 
Tonkin.� 
After the Japanese attack, Sabattier and Alessandri's 
troops linked up and moved westward to Dien Bien Phu. 
Hundreds of troops died during the fifty-seven day retreat. 
Marching an exhausting 800 miles to Kunming, China, they 
managed to escape from the Japanese. In a conversation with 
General Albert c. Wedemeyer on June 4, 1945, Sabattier 
M Patti, 74-75. 
� Ibid., 74. 
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estimated that there were 74,000 regulars in the French army 
at the time of the coup and that only 6,000 escaped with him 
to South China. Of those, there were only 320 officers, and 
2,150 Europeans. The rest were Indochinese. 46 He also 
estimated that at the time of the Japanese coup, there were 
approximately so,ooo French men, women, and children in 
Indochina. 47
By March 12 the Japanese were in control of all the 
main lowland centers in Indochina. The April 1 American 
invasion of Okinawa, however, made it clear to the Japanese 
that southern China and Southeast Asia would be bypassed. 
Their fears of an Allied attack on Indochina subsided. 48
This coup was an accomplishment for the Japanese army 
whose forces were greatly outnumbered by the French. The 
French had a total of 99,042 armed men, of which 74,020 were 
regulars, including 19,371 Europeans and 54,649 indigenous 
troops. The remaining forces consisted of local militia 
totaling 24,680 men with a cadre of 362 Europeans. 49
Tsuchihashi later recalled that the coup's success was 
largely the result of three factors - a lack of French 
caution, the choice of date, and the low morale of the 
46 General G[abriel]. Sabattier, Le Destin De L'Indochine: 
Souvenirs et Documents, 1941-1951 (Paris, Librairie Plon, 1952), 
455. (Henceforth, Sabattier]
47 Ibid. , 8 O.
48 Marr, 144. 
G McAlister, 110. 
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French Indochinese Army.� 
In summary, the French were shortsighted. In their 
arrogance and self-delusion, they failed to foresee the 
Japanese takeover early enough. The Japanese, however, 
moved swiftly to disarm the French and gain complete control 
of Indochina. This successful military strike was to 
provoke a rise in Vietnamese nationalism by holding out the 
prospect of independence. We turn now to that period in 
Vietnamese history. 
� Nitz, 348. 
CHAPTER IV 
VIETNAM AFTER THE COUP 
All French officials, from Decoux down to the lowest 
functionary, were either killed, arrested, imprisoned, or 
confined to quarters. Generals Mordant and Ayme were 
quick�y arrested as were key businessmen and pro-Gaullists. 
Japanese troops moved quickly to seize administrative 
buildings and public utilities throughout Vietnam. They 
also took over radio stations, telegraph centers, banks and 
industries. 1 Over 750 French civilian prisoners were 
ordered to relocate in seven selected cities - Hanoi, Vinh, 
Nha Trang, Saigon (with the exception of Cholon), Phnom 
Penh, and Vientiane. 2 Because of overcrowding and disease, 
400 of these civilians died during their incarceration. 3
French civilians who were not arrested were prohibited from 
going out at night. They were also forbidden to hold 
meetings of more than four persons or to walk in groups of 
1 Hammer, 38. 
2 IMTFE, E664: Proclamation No. 9, Sub-Paragraph 1, no date 
given but was issued between March 10-12, 1945: 7,188-7,189. This 
is a group of ten proclamations from the High Command of the 
Japanese Army setting forth a series of steps to be taken to 
achieve control over the military and administrative 
organizations in Indochina. 
3 Boettcher, 49. 
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more than four persons. 4 Since the Japanese did not have an 
adequate number of administrative personnel to fill all of 
the government positions, the Army encouraged French 
civilians to remain in their posts and guaranteed to pay 
them the same salary if they stayed. 5
M�ny government positions formerly held by Frenchmen 
were given to the Vietnamese. Thus, the Vietnamese suddenly 
found themselves in higher positions of authority than they 
had ever held under the French. In the minds of many 
Vietnamese, the French had lost all their power. The 
Japanese takeover encouraged the Vietnamese to believe that 
finally they might break the chains of bondage under which 
the French had kept them for the last hundred years. The 
Japanese also freed 8-10,000 political prisoners who had 
been incarcerated by the French. Many of these assumed 
posts in the new government. 6 The Japanese coup destroyed 
the illusion of French omnipotence and invulnerability. It 
brought down the fa9ade of French authority, and enabled the 
Vietnamese to establish a government that was subservient to 
the Japanese. 
4 IMTFE, E664: Proclamation No. 2, Sub-Paragraphs 4 & 5, 
dated March 10, 1946 [sic - typographical error should be 1945]: 
7,185. This is a group of ten proclamations from the High Command 
of the Japanese Army setting forth a series of steps to be taken 
to achieve control over the military and administrative 
organizations in Indochina. 
5 Nitz, 345. 
6 Elsbree, 98. 
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Fighting in Hue was still in progress on March 10. The 
Japanese "rescued" Emperor Bao Dai there. That is, they 
took him into custody. They were afraid that he might 
escape abroad and set up an anti-Japanese nationalist 
organization and, since they planned to use him as a puppet, 
they made sure he did not leave Vietnam. Because Bao Dai 
thought that the Japanese would force him to abdicate, he 
was surprised when they told him that they wanted him as the 
head of a new native government.7
On March 11, 1945, Bao Dai was permitted to announce 
the independence of Annam. The Japanese retained control of 
Tonkin and Cochinchina. This declaration was the precursor 
to Vietnamese "independence." It had been prepared by 
Yokoyama Seiko, Minister for Economic Affairs of the 
Japanese diplomatic mission in Indochina and later advisor 
to Bao Dai. Bao Dai's declaration of independence abrogated 
the Franco-Annamese treaty of 1884 which had provided for a 
French protectorate over Annam.8 Bao Dai pledged 
cooperation with Japan in the Greater East Asia War.9 On 
March 12 the Japanese Commander-in-Chief in Indochina 
proclaimed 
The Japanese army will support any endeavor to satisfy 
the eager desire of independence so dear to all the 
peoples of Indo-China . • . . and to help their sincere 
7 Nitz, 344. 
8 Ibid., 345; R. B. Smith, 286. 
9 Nitz, 345. 
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national movement in conformity with the fundamental
principles of the declaration of Greater East Asia. 10 
In June 1945, however, three months after Bao Dai had 
declared Vietnamese "independence," the Japanese had not 
formally recognized Vietnamese independence, or signed any 
treaty with a Vietnamese governrnent. 11 Unfortunately for
the Vietnamese, the Japanese promise of independence turned 
out to be hollow. In 1942, during the establishment of the 
Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, the Japanese had 
already decided that "It must also be noted that the 
independence of various peoples of East Asia should be based 
upon the idea of constructing East Asia as 'independent 
countries existing within the New Order of East Asia' and 
that this conception differs from an independence based on 
the idea of liberalism and national self-determination. "12 
At the behest of the Japanese, Bao Dai asked Tran Trong 
Kirn, a renowned scholar known for his textbooks on 
Confucianism, Buddhism and Vietnamese history, to become his 
10 IMTFE, E664: Proclamation No. 10, dated March 12, 1945: 
7,191. This is a group of ten proclamations from the High Command 
of the Japanese Army setting forth a series of steps to be taken 
to achieve control over the military and administrative 
organizations in Indochina. 
11 Huynh Kirn Khanh, "The Vietnamese August Revolution 
Reinterpreted," Journal of Asian Studies 30 (August 1971): 766. 
[Henceforth, Khanh] 
12 IMTFE, El336: "Secret - Draft of Basic Plan for 
Establishment of Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere," by 
Total War Research Institute, dated January 27, 1942; Chapter 3 
(Political Construction) (1) Basic Plan - Paragraph 2 (b): 
12,015. Italics mine. 
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Prime Minister and form a government. 13 In 1943, Kim had 
felt threatened by the French because of his association 
with several Japanese experts in Vietnamese studies and his 
affiliation with a progressive association in Hanoi. He 
asked the Japanese army to give him asylum. The Japanese 
flew him first to Singapore and then to Bangkok, where he 
stayed for most of the war. On April 17 Kim formed a new 
Vietnamese government that lasted until August 25, 1945 • 14
From March until the August Revolution, Vietnam would 
enjoy what was called doc-lap banh ve (caricatured cake, or 
fake, independence) • 15 Tran Trong Kim's Cabinet was a 
government in name only. The political structure of 
Indochina changed very little. 16 Kim's appointees had 
limited political backgrounds. They had only served on 
French-created councils or committees, so they had not had 
the opportunity to acquire the administrative experience 
necessary to operate a government. 
incapable of working together to 
Consequently, they were 
handle the chaotic 
situation. Kim did, nevertheless, replace pro-French 
mandarins in Hue, and his cabinet was able to moderate rice 
confiscations, reduce some taxes, and loosen censorship. By 
July his government had persuaded the Japanese to relinquish 
u R. B. Smith, 288.
14 Ibid.
15 Khanh, 765.
16 b'd I 1 • , 766.
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direct administration of Hanoi, Haiphong, and Da Nang. 17 
Another result of the Japanese coup was a surprising 
upsurge in political involvement on the part of the 
Vietnamese throughout the country. In the first month after 
the coup, they were apprehensive about potential Japanese 
repression. Having seen their past political activities 
suppressed by French colonial authorities, the Vietnamese 
were naturally mistrustful of any foreigners who promised 
political freedom. It soon became apparent, however, that 
the Japanese were going to be indifferent towards them as 
long as their actions were not anti-Japanese. The Japanese 
Army had decided not to interfere in Indochina's internal 
affairs and left the Vietnamese free to do what they 
wanted. 18 The Vietnamese soon began to participate openly 
and enthusiastically in political discussion. 
Political rallies and public demonstrations became 
common in the public squares and marketplaces of most towns 
and cities. Throughout Vietnam, as observed by the 
periodical Ngay Nay (Today), "after the brief storm of 
bullets of March 9, political parties, groups and 
associations shot up like mushrooms. "19 Many of these were 
17 Marr, 145. 
18 IMTFE, E663: THE DISPOSITION OF FRENCH INDO-CHINA, Part 3 
(The development of the disposition), Sub-Paragraph (h), dated 
December 17, 1945: 7,180. This is part of a report relating the 
history of the Japanese 38th Army which describes the activities 
of the Japanese in Indochina during 1945. 
19 Khanh, 767; quote from Ngay Nay (Today), June 2, 1945. 
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not well organized. Most had no real ideology or political 
program, and their leadership was inexperienced. They were, 
however, unabashedly nationalistic.w Driven by their anti­
colonialist feelings after the coup, few Vietnamese were 
inclined to collaborate with their new and "supposed" 
saviors - the Japanese. 
The famine was an important backdrop to the drama of 
the Japanese takeover and rising Vietnamese patriotism. Its 
origins and course require some explanation if we are to 
understand the full picture of Vietnam in the critical year 
of 1945. 
In 1943 the French had introduced an unpopular system 
of government purchase of rice. They paid people only 1.40 
piasters for a ten-kilogram container of rice while the 
market price was 2.50 to 3.00 piasters. During the second 
yearly harvest in June 1944 the government still paid 1.40 
piasters, but the market rate had jumped to 6.00-7.00 
piasters. By the 1944 autumn harvest the market price was 
20-30 piasters and rapidly rose to 60-70 piasters, but the
government still only paid 1.40 piasters.21 Having to sell 
their crop at such a low price, Vietnamese farmers could not 
repurchase the rice they desperately needed to survive. 
In mid-1943 the monthly per capita rice ration in the 
20 Ibid, 767. 
21 Long, 222-223; he quotes from Tran Van Mai, "Who Committed 
This Crime?" 
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towns and cities was 15 kilograms. By the end of 1943 it 
was lowered to 12 kilograms. Four months later it was 
reduced to 10 kilograms. After the March 9, 1945, coup it 
was cut to 7. Since the average adult needed at least 12 
kilograms of rice to continue functioning, this was the 
beginning of starvation. 22 
Starting in late 1943, the weather made the 
farm situation difficult. Three typhoons hit the coastal 
areas of northern Vietnam (known as Bae Viet) from May to 
September 1944 and destroyed the much of the rice crop. 
Starvation began to appear in October 1944, and the winter 
following was unusually cold. The most severe period was 
between January and June of 1945. Hunger was not new to the 
people of Vietnam. Under French colonialism, it had become 
"a permanent feature of their life. "23 Yet this famine was 
the most disastrous one in recent times. To quote an 
eyewitness, 
People looked at each other with all hope drained from 
their eyes and uttered words that made it seem that 
they were saying farewells to one another • . • •  They 
were so hungry that they had to eat marsh pennywort, 
potato leaves, bran, banana roots, and the bark of 
trees. The villagers - fathers and sons, brothers and 
sisters, husbands and wives, all of them alike - could 
no longer save one another. 24 
Peasants also 
22 Marr, 135. 
23 Khanh, 768. 
24 Long, 228; he quotes from Tran Van Mai, "Who Committed 
This Crime?" 
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began to eat ground paddy husks, . . • grass, herbs, 
clover - all the feed that was normally reserved for 
their cattle and pigs, all the plants that were not 
poisonous, anything that could be swallowed. As the 
Viet Nam Tan Bao (New Tribune of Viet Nam) reported: A 
dead dog or a dead rat was an occasion for the entire 
hamlet to get together and share a few bites.� 
Northern Vietnam seldom grew enough rice to feed itself 
and was heavily dependent upon the South to supplement its 
needs. The war worsened the problem. The French in 
Indochina had agreed to supply industrial products to the 
Japanese war machine. Peasants were forced to convert large 
tracts of arable land in North and Central Vietnam from rice 
fields to fields of jute for cordage, and cornfields were 
made into fields of peanuts needed for machine oil. 26 Hemp 
and castor oil plants were also planted for use by the 
Japanese. During the worst of the famine people sometimes 
managed to sow a paddy only to die before the crop was 
harvested. 
In the cities life was not much better. Peasants fled 
to the urban areas but still starved. Parents tried to sell 
or give away their children and, when this stratagem failed, 
they abandoned them. Khanh has written that 
Rows of naked peasants, little more than skeletons, 
lined the walls, waiting for death to take them away. 
At 12:00 noon and 5:00 P.M. daily, oxcarts made their 
regular runs. Their mission was to collect dead and 
dying bodies piling up on the pavement or at street 
corners. These were then dumped - sometimes still 
protesting - into mass graves outside the city 
25 Khanh, 768-769. 
26 Ibid., 768. 
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limits.v 
The French and the Japanese appear to have done little to 
alleviate the disaster. The Japanese even made Bao Dai 
promise, during his independence speech, that the delivery 
of regular supplies to the army would continue.28 The 
government of Tran Trong Kim was all but helpless because 
the Japanese, fighting a battle to the death in the Pacific, 
commandeered as much rice and other supplies as possible.29
As we have seen, the Japanese coup finally ignited 
Vietnamese yearnings for nationhood. This rise in 
nationalism took place during an increasingly serious 
famine. This is one reason why the Japanese could not 
expect their occupation to be entirely peaceful. Though 
starving, or perhaps because they were starving, the 
Vietnamese began to rise up against the Japanese. And 
there, ready to lead them, was a little known but well 
organized movement of long standing, the Viet Minh. Its 
leader - Ho Chi Minh - was an uncommon man with a 
charismatic talent for leadership. 
v Ibid., 769. 
u Ibid.
� Ibid. 
CHAPTER V 
THE NATIONALIST, HO CHI MINH, AND THE VIET MINH
Ho Chi Minh and other Vietnamese patriots formed 
a guerilla organization called the Viet Minh in May 1941 to 
fight the Japanese and the French in Vietnam. Although it 
was based on Communist ideology, it basically appealed to 
the nationalist sentiment of the Vietnamese people. A brief 
sketch of Ho's ideological development is necessary to show 
that his commitment to Communism was, at best, a tactical 
move. Ho said "I am a professional revolutionary • • . .  "1
However, his characterization of himself could easily be 
expanded to "professional revolutionary patriot" because a 
free Vietnam was Ho's overriding passion for most of his 
life. The movement he founded reflected this. One of his 
compatriots, Tran Ngoc Danh, summed up Ho's beliefs in this 
manner: 
How many times in my life I've been asked: you who know 
Ho Chi Minh so well, can you say whether he is a 
nationalist or a communist? The answer is simple: Ho 
Chi Minh is both. For him, nationalism and communism, 
the end and the means, complement one another; or 
rather, they merge inextricably. 2
From the perspective of the last decade of the twentieth 
century, we know that this is not the paradox it seems to 
1 Robert Shaplen, The Lost Revolution (New York: Harper & 
Row, 1965), 40. [Henceforth, Shaplen] 
2 Charles Fenn, Ho Chi Minh (London: Studio Vista, 1973), 
40. (Henceforth, Fenn] He quotes from (No author cited] Histoire
du President Ho, Foreign Languages Press, Hanoi, 1949, 33.
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be. Nationalism retained its power in many Marxist regimes 
and reemerged openly following the relaxation of the Soviet 
hold on eastern Europe. In Vietnam, nationalism was the 
stronger of the two from the start of the Viet Minh's 
history. 
There is no major twentieth century political figure 
about whose early life we know so little as Ho Chi Minh. 
Many years are a total blank. His exact year of birth is 
uncertain, but 1890 is the most accepted. The exact day and 
month is well established - May 19. He was born in the 
village of Kim-Lien, in the province of Nghe-An, in Central 
Vietnam near the city of Vinh. His original name was 
probably Nguyen Sinh Cung but may also have been Nguyen That 
Thanh. 3 
It is believed that he was the youngest of three 
children although not much is known about his family. His 
father was a well-to-do peasant, an ardent nationalist, and 
a scholar who later spent the last twenty years of his life 
wandering around Cochinchina, Cambodia, and Thailand. Ho's 
father taught him to read at an early age. Ho learned 
French and Cantonese since most books in Indochina at that 
time were written in those languages. Thus, Ho's 
3 Many scholars differ over Ho's original name. It was 
either Nguyen Tat (or That) Thanh, or Nguyen Sinh Cung. 
According to Bernard Fall in The Two Vietnams (New York: Praeger, 
1963), 81: "A perusal of a dozen Communist sources on his 
background will produce at least ten different birth 
names . • . •  " 
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proficiency with foreign languages dates from his early 
youth. During his lifetime he learned to speak seven or 
eight different languages. 4 He is said to have attended 
Vietnam's best high school, the Lycee Quoc-Hoc, at Hue. In 
1910 he was dismissed from it for anti-French activities. 
He drifted south until he obtained a job as a teacher in a 
private school in the fishing village of Phan-Thiet, 
100 miles east of Saigon. He soon left that job, moved to 
Saigon in 1911, and changed his name to Ba to escape the 
scrutiny of the French police. 5
From 1911 to 1915 he wandered around the world as a 
cook aboard the French ship Amiral Latouche-Treville. He 
traveled to the United states, and visited Boston and San 
Francisco. Eventually, he settled in Brooklyn, where he 
worked as an itinerant laborer and learned to speak 
English. 6 In 1915 he was living in London, where he became 
interested in the Irish uprising. He also began to 
associate with members of the Fabian Society, a Socialist 
movement that had as its goal a democratic Socialist state 
in Great Britain. It advocated an evolutionary Socialism 
rather than revolution. While in London, Ho also read many 
books on politics and began to acquire a revolutionary 
4 Shaplen, 35. 
5 Bernard F. Fall, The Two Vietnams (New York: Praeger, 
1963), 85. [Henceforth, Fall - Two] 
6 Fenn, 23. 
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outlook. 7
In late 1917 he moved to Paris, and it is here that Ho 
adopted his other well-known pseudonym, Nguyen Ai Quoc, 
which means "Nguyen the Patriot."8 In 1919, during the 
Versailles peace talks, Ho, inspired by Woodrow Wilson's 
Fourteen Points and call for self-determination, wrote a 
letter to Wilson concerning the status of Indochina. He 
included a petition for Vietnamese autonomy entitled 
"Claims of the Annamite People." The petition asked for 
representation in the French parliament. He requested that 
7 Jean Lacouture, Ho Chi Minh: A Political Biography (New 
York: Random House, 1968), 18. [Henceforth, Lacouture] 
8 Throughout his life, Ho used many aliases. Below is a list 
of some of those names and the dates in which he used them. This 
list is mainly from Chen, 37-38. 
Nguyen Sinh Cung [or Nguyen Van Cung] (1890-1900) 
Nguyen Tat Thanh (1900-1912) 
Ba (1912-1917) 
Nguyen Ai Quoc (1917-1924, 1930-1933) 
Nguyen o Phap (1923-1924) 
Ly Thuy [or Li Jui] {1924-1927) 
Vuong Son Nhi [ or Mr. Vuong, or Old Vuong] (1924-1927) 
Wang Ta-jen [or Vuong oat Nhan) (1926) 
Tong Van So {1924-1927) 
Thau Chin (1928-1929) 
Song Man Cho [or Sung Man-ch'o) {1931-1932) 
Linov (1933-1938) 
Lin {1934-1938) 
P. C. Lin (1938-1940)
Ho Quang [or Hu Kuang) (1938-1940)
Comrade Vuong (1939-1941)
Mr. Tran [or Old Chen] (1939-1940, 1944)
Ho Chi Minh (1940-1969)
Thu [or Old Thu] (1941-1942)
Vuong Quoc Tuan [or Hoang Quoc Tuan] {1941-1942)
Lucius (1944-1945)
Ho Ting Ching (1944)
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there be freedom of the press and freedom to hold meetings 
or form associations. He asked for the release of political 
prisoners, and that there be equality of legal rights 
between French and Annamese. 9 Ho rented formal wear and a 
bowler hat and tried to deliver his letter to Secretary of 
State �obert Lansing on June 18, 1919. His attempt came to 
naught. He was unceremoniously shown the door because so 
many other representatives of the underdeveloped world -
Arabs, Kurds, Armenians, etc. - were also clamoring for 
national recognition and restoration of their boundaries. 10 
His attempt to appeal for the rights of his people, however, 
attracted the attention of prominent Socialists such as Leon 
Blum and he was subsequently invited to the Congress of the 
French Socialist Party at Tours in December 1920. 11
On December 25, 1920, the Parti Communiste Fran9ais 
(PCF) was formed with Ho as one of its charter members. By 
his own admission, Ho knew little about either Socialism or 
Communism, and he joined the PCF because they had befriended 
him. In 1960 he wrote that "I understood neither what was a 
party, a trade-union, nor what was Socialism or 
9 Lacouture, 24. 
1° Fall - Two, 88; Lacouture, 24. 
11 Stanley Karnow, Vietnam: A History (New York: Viking, 
1983), 121. 
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Communism. 1112 However, Ho was profoundly influenced by 
Lenin's Theses on the National and Colonial Questions which 
Lenin had issued at the Second Comintern Congress in 1920 
and that had been published in Paris by L'Humanite. In his 
Theses Lenin stated that Asian Communists not only had to 
work with nationalist groups in each country but also had to 
organize the peasantry as the primary force in the struggle 
to end Western imperialism. 13
After reading this treatise many times, Ho concluded 
that ". • • only Socialism and Communism can liberate the 
oppressed nations and the working people throughout 
the world from slavery. "14 It was this document which 
attracted Ho to Communism because he believed Lenin's claim 
in the Theses that 
all the national liberation movements in the colonies 
and among the oppressed nationalities • . • are 
learning from bitter experience that their only 
salvation lies in the Soviet system's victory over 
world imperialism. 15
Lenin further explained that the working masses of colonial 
countries were being abused by the same capitalists who were 
12 Ho Chi Minh, "The Path Which Led Me To Leninism, 11 in On
Revolution - Selected Writings, 1920-66, edited and with 
introduction by Bernard B. Fall. {New York: Praeger, 1967), 5. 
[Henceforth, Ho Chi Minh) 
13 Gary R. Hess, Vietnam and the United States {Boston: 
Twayne Publishers, 1990), 15. 
14 Ho Chi Minh, 6-7. 
15 Robert c. Tucker, ed. , The Lenin Anthology {New York: 
Norton, 1975), 621. 
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exploiting the proletariat in the home country. Thus, 
Lenin's uncompromising attitude toward imperialism was to 
have a profound influence upon Ho. He came to believe that 
fate had ordained a Communist strategy to free Vietnam from 
the French colonialists, or rather, that Vietnam's fate 
could be changed. As one historian put it, 
The Marxist concept included the inevitability of 
proletarian victory. It is not without significance 
that the Vietnamese expression for revolution - each 
mang - means literally "change fate. "16
Ho concluded that only a force as ruthless and brutal as 
Communism could generate the force he needed to make his 
nationalism succeed. Ho quickly became disillusioned with 
the PCF, however, because of its indifference towards 
solving colonial questions despite its verbal declarations 
of support of the Communist International's program on 
colonial affairs. 17 He became a spokesman for oppressed 
colonial peoples and founded the Intercolonial Union, an 
organization of radicals from the French colonies who were 
living in France. 
In 1923 Comintern leaders invited him to Moscow because 
they thought he showed uncommon promise as an Asian 
revolutionary. Ho was soon on good terms with Bukharin, 
Dimitrov, Trotsky, and especially Stalin. He briefly 
16 Fenn, 41. 
17 I. Milton Sacks, "Marxism In Viet Nam," in Marxism in
Southeast Asia: A study of Four Countries, edited by Frank N. 
Trager, (Stanford [CA]: Stanford University Press, 1959), 108. 
[Henceforth, Sacks] 
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attended the University of Oriental Workers (also known as 
the Stalin School for the Toilers of the East) which was 
founded on the edicts of Lenin's Theses. This school was a 
training ground for Asian and other Third World insurgents. 
Here he learned how to turn Communist theory into practice 
because 
Lenin emphasized that hesitation, weakness, pity, 
deviation, reformism and compromise all helped the 
enemy. Remembering the goal, the communist could not 
shirk the means. Violence wins the revolution; 
dictatorship consolidates it. Both require ruthless 
leadership. 18 
From June 17 to July 8, 1923, he was a delegate to the Fifth 
Congress of the Communist International. In October Ho also 
was appointed as a PCF delegate to the Peasant International 
(Krestintern) where he was elected as the Asian 
representative on the Permanent Directing Committee of the 
Krestintern. He served in that capacity for eighteen 
months • 19 While in Moscow he wrote a book entitled Le 
proces de la colonisation franqaise (French Colonization on 
Trial). It was published in Paris in 1926 and was an 
attack on French colonial policies. It was smuggled into 
Vietnam and became a bible for early Vietnamese 
nationalists. 20 
In 1925 the Comintern sent Ho to Canton to serve as a 
18 Fenn, 46. 
19 Sacks, 109. 
20 Hammer, 76. 
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translator and interpreter for Mikhail Borodin, the 
Comintern adviser to Chiang Kai-shek. Borodin's assignment 
was to manage the reshaping of the Kuomintang. Ho would 
later copy Borodin's organizational activity by building a 
Vietnamese national revolutionary movement comparable to the 
KMT. 21 At this time Canton was a center for Vietnamese 
exiles so, in 1925, under Comintern orders, Ho began to 
organize the Vietnamese students in South China as the 
Revolutionary Youth League (Viet Nam Thanh Nien each Mang 
Dong Chi Hoi) which was usually known by its abbreviated 
name of Thanh Nien (Youth). Although Ho used 
Communist organizational methods and provided it with a 
Communist core, "The most noteworthy feature of the new 
organization was its deliberate attempt to appeal to 
Vietnamese nationalism. . • . 1122 
In 1927 Chiang purged the Communists from the 
Kuomintang and thousands were either imprisoned or executed. 
Ho escaped and fled to Moscow. In his absence the 
Thanh Nien disintegrated and split into three or four 
different factions, one of which was the Viet Nam Quoc 
Dan Dang (Viet Nam Nationalist Party, or VNQDD). The 
VNQDD was a non-Communist, pro-Chinese, revolutionary 
nationalist organization that modeled itself after the 
21 Sacks, 116. 
22 William J. Duiker, The Communist Road to Power in Vietnam 
(Boulder [CO): Westview, 1981), 19. 
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Kuomintang. It would cause trouble for Ho in the future.n 
Ho wandered around Europe and Asia for several years 
until he settled in Hong Kong where, on February 3, 1930, he 
formed the Viet Nam Cong San Dang (Vietnam Communist Party) 
from the remnants of the Thanh Nien. In October, at the 
request of the Comintern, it was renamed the Indochinese 
Communist Party (Dong-duong Cong-san Dang), or ICP, to 
include Laos and Cambodia.� 
Meanwhile, during the years 1927-1930 the VNQDD had 
become powerful in Tonkin. It advocated the use of violence 
to accomplish its aims. After the 1929 assassination of an 
important Frenchman, the police arrested many VNQDD members 
forcing the party to reorganize on the Communist cell 
pattern. At that time its leader, Nguyen Thai Hoc, planned 
an armed uprising against the French. He believed it 
would be successful because it would gain the support of 
the Vietnamese masses.� 
The uprising began on February 9-10 1930, at the Red 
River port of Yen Bai in Tonkin.26 It quickly spread to 
twenty-five provinces in all three regions of Vietnam. The 
French conducted a bloody but highly effective purge of both 
the Vietnamese Communists and VNQDD members. The revolt was 
n Patti, 530; Documents/August Revolution, iv. 
u Patti, 508.
� Ibid., 531. 
u Buttinger, 109.
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crushed by mid-1931 and hundreds of Communists were killed 
or imprisoned. According to one soviet account, based on 
Vietnamese and French sources, there were 58 executions (22 
by guillotine), 61 life imprisonments, and 42 prison 
sentences of varying length; another 576 lesser leaders 
were also tried.v Those who survived fled to China, but 
Nguyen Thi Hoc was captured and executed. Pham Van Dong and 
Le Due Tho, later confederates of Ho Chi Minh, spent several 
years on the prison island of Poulo Condore.28 Most of the 
Communist leadership died in prison. French action thus 
ended the ICP and VNQDD as influences in Vietnam during the 
1930s because both movements had failed to take into 
account one of Lenin's rules - that a revolution must never 
be started until the insurgents are ready to fight to 
victory. 
As a consequence of the uprising, Ho was imprisoned by 
the British in Hong Kong.· During one of his court hearings 
he denied that he was a Communist and stated that he 
was a nationalist. 29 While in the prison hospital he made 
v Charles B. McLane, Soviet Strategies In Southeast 
(Princeton [NJ]: Princeton University Press, 1966), 149; 
quotes from A. Dantzig, Indokitai (Moscow, 1931), 107. 
[Henceforth, McLane] 
u Poulo Condore (also known as Con Son) is located
approximately 60 miles south of the Mekong River delta. 
notorious as a concentration camp where the French sent 
of political prisoners. 
Asia 
he 
It was 
thousands 
� Dennis J. Duncanson, "Ho-chi-Minh in Hong Kong, 1931-32," 
The China Quarterly 57 (January March 1974): 91. 
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friends with many of the staff and persuaded one of them to 
sign a fake death certificate. With the help of Frank 
Loseby, a noted British anti-imperialist, he used the 
certificate to escape in mid-1932. This led to rumors in 
the Vietnamese community of Hong Kong and beyond that Ho was 
dead. He passed into obscurity for the next five years. Ho 
finally settled in China sometime after 1938. 30
In May 1941 Ho briefly appeared in Vietnam, returning 
to his homeland for the first time in almost thirty years. 
From May 10 to May 19, the Executive Committee of the 
revived ICP held its Eighth Conference in a cave near Pac 
Bo, in the remote Cao Bang Province of northeastern Vietnam. 
Ho chaired the Conference, marking his emergence as ICP 
leader. He and his followers agreed to establish the 
Vietnamese Independence League (Viet Nam Doc Lap Dong Minh 
Hoi) , or Viet Minh Front. 31
The Viet Minh's immediate task was to form a "united 
front" with non-Communist elements by advocating the broadly 
popular goal of national liberation along with socioeconomic 
reform. Its purpose was to unite "all patriots, without 
distinction of wealth, age, sex, religion or political 
outlook so that they may work together for the liberation of 
our people and the salvation of our nation."n The Viet 
30 Ibid, 99. 
31 Fall - Two, 62; Khanh, 772; Patti, 524. 
n Lacouture, 75. 
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Minh stressed independence from foreign rule. Its 
moderate domestic program, combined with its determination 
to expel both the French and the Japanese from Indochina and 
establish an independent democratic republic, guaranteed its 
widespread appeal to all social classes throughout Vietnam. 
The main Viet Minh cadres and leadership were explicitly 
Communist from the outset. Rank and file support came from 
trade unions, youth groups, peasant organizations, and, in 
due course, nationalist organizations composed of middle­
class elements. As McLane summarized it, the "Vietminh, in 
short, had the virtue, from the Communist viewpoint, of 
exercising the appeal of a •united front from above' while 
organized as a •united front from below.'"" The ideology 
held by the Viet Minh's followers was less Communism than 
anti-colonialism and nationalism. Communism's anti­
colonial stance was the primary source of its appeal to 
Vietnamese intellectuals. It provided a doctrinal basis for 
anti-colonialism and consequently legitimized the 
independence movement.34 In this manner, the "Communist 
leaders succeeded in keeping the support of many of the non­
Communist nationalists. "35 The French failure to allow a 
nationalist alternative to the Viet Minh drove moderate 
Vietnamese willingly into the ranks of the revolutionary 
33 McLane, 261. 
34 Cooper, 11. 
"Sacks, 102-103. 
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movement. The result, according to I. Milton Sacks, was 
that 
nationalism became the Vietminh's major ideological 
weapon, and with this psychological advantage its mass 
support was assured • . • .  The Vietminh's emphasis on 
organized participation by the whole population • • •
was of major psychological and organizational 
importance in its success. 36 
During most of World War II, Ho directed the Viet 
Minh's activities from a safe haven inside the KMT­
controlled part of China. For a time, however, he was 
imprisoned at the order of Tai Li, Chiang Kai-shek's trusted 
subordinate and chief of the KMT's secret police. On August 
29, 1942, Ho was arrested apparently because the Kuomintang 
had made its own plans to establish a Vietnamese nationalist 
movement subject to its control. The pretext for his arrest 
was suspicion of espionage and invalid documents.37 He was 
first confined at Chinghsi, 125 miles west of Nanning, the 
capital of Kwangsi Province, but was moved often and later 
recalled that he was confined in eighteen different 
prisons.38 Ho was finally released on September 10, 1943, 
after agreeing, in return for his freedom, to mobilize the 
Viet Minh organization to cooperate with the Chinese forces 
under the control of an important Chinese warlord, General 
36 Cooper, 11-12. 
37 Chang Fa-K'uei, The Reminiscences of Chang Fa'Kuei (1896-
1980) as to told to Julie Lieng-ying How (1926-1982) (Chinese 
Oral History Project - East Asian Institute; New York: Columbia 
University, 1970-1983, Microfiche), 683. [Henceforth, Chang] 
38 Ibid., 684. 
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Chang Fa-K'uei. Chang, who had been responsible for the 
expulsion of the Chinese Communists from Canton in 1927, 
was all the more vigilantly anti-Communist in 1943 because 
of Chinese Communist battles against KMT forces raging 
within the anti-Japanese war. He was, however, evidently 
willing to overlook Ho's Communist background. He planned 
to use Ho's nationalist convictions for his own purposes and 
those of the Kuomintang. 39 
Chang secured Ho's release without the knowledge of Tai 
Li's or his minions. Chang later recalled, however, that 
when he informed Chiang Kai-shek's headquarters of Ho's 
release, "the Center approved of my action. 1140 He released 
Ho for several specific reasons. First, he wanted Ho to 
join the Viet Nam each Menh Dong Minh Hoi (Vietnam 
Revolutionary League) "to strengthen the League," Chang 
later recalled.41 Secondly, Chang had just received word 
from Chungking to prepare for an eventual Chinese invasion 
of Vietnam. Chang needed intelligence on the situation 
across the border and was anxious to turn the nationalist 
factions inside Vietnam into a useful political 
� Ibid., 685-686. 
40 Ibid., 686. Many writers have claimed that Ho wrote to 
Chang from prison offering to reorganize the Viet Minh's 
intelligence network in Tonkin for use by the Chinese in exchange 
for his release. Chang recalled "He might have written me but I 
do not recall hearing from him." Chang, 687. 
41 Ibid., 685-686. 
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organization.42 In releasing Ho, Chang claimed his 
principal motive had been to help a weak and oppressed 
people to win independence.0
It was at this time that Ho, at Chang's suggestion, 
changed his name from Nguyen Ai Quoc to his most famous 
pseudonym, Ho Chi Minh, or "He Who Enlightens." He had used 
this name briefly in the early 1940s, but now used it to 
hide his identity from Tai Li's agents and dispel the aura 
of his past Communist activities. Ho directed a number of 
Vietnamese nationalist groups from China. Chang paid 
him $100,000 Chinese a month for the espionage operations 
in Indochina and Ho skillfully funneled most of those funds 
to the Viet Minh. But the intelligence that he provided 
Chang was "trivial and on occasion, inaccurate."44
While in China, Ho adroitly deferred to Chinese 
authorities by pretending to work with them concerning 
revolutionary plans for Vietnam after World War II. If 
anything, Ho was a master politician who "always avoided 
open conflict with an enemy whose power he knew to be 
greater than his own. 1145 A skilled opportunist, he was 
not overly concerned with either appearances or what he had 
42 Duiker, 78. 
43 Chang, 687. 
44 Donald Lancaster, The Emancipation of French Indochina 
(New York: Octagon Books, 1974), 114; he quotes Pierre Celerier, 
Menaces sur le Viet-Nam (Saigon, 1956), 21. 
� Buttinger, 298-299. 
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to do or say to avoid strife with potential adversaries. He 
told Chang Fa-K'uei that he was a communist Party member but 
qualified himself by stating that his immediate objective 
was "Vietnamese freedom and independence. He wanted 
specially to guarantee that communism could not be carried 
out in Vietnam for fifty years. 1146 Chang helped him because 
Chang was bitterly opposed to colonialism and Ho was, in 
Chang's eyes, "not a Chinese communist but a foreign 
communist. . . . He was anti-imperialist, not against us. "47 
Ho probably adhered to some tenets of Communism, but he 
never lost sight of his ultimate goal - Vietnamese 
independence from French rule. 
The opportunity to achieve that goal came with abrupt 
suddenness on March 9, 1945, with the Japanese coup against 
the French. When Ho heard the news of the French fall, he 
readied his return to Vietnam. He expected that the Allies 
were going to win in Europe, and that they would then focus 
their military might on Japan. Realizing that his time was 
limited, he had to return to Tonkin as soon as possible "to 
present a de facto, if not de juris (sic], authority in 
Indochina to the conquering Allies if he were to gain and 
retain control of an independent Viet Nam."" 
Actually, the plan for a Viet Minh takeover had long 
46 Chang, 688. 
47 Ib'd 850 1 • ' •
48 Patti, 52. 
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been in readiness. During the Eighth Conference of the ICP 
in May 1941, at which the Viet Minh Front was created, 
groundwork for an insurrection was laid. The Viet Minh was 
created to implement the resolution of national liberation. 
By late 1942, because of effective grass-roots organizing, 
"Viet Minh Committees" had begun to exercise effective power 
on the local level through an underground administrative 
organization that paralleled the French.� 
On December 22, 1944, Vo Nguyen Giap created an armed 
force in the Dinh Ca Valley and named it the "Armed 
Propaganda Brigade for the Liberation of Vietnam." That 
date is now celebrated as the official birthday of the 
"Vietnamese People's Army." The Brigade consisted at first 
of a mere thirty-four men "chosen from section leaders, 
platoon commanders, or from outstanding members of local 
armed groups. 1150 On Christmas eve 1944, the Brigade staged 
its first attack against the two small French border posts 
of Phai Khat and Na Ngan. Both French garrisons were 
massacred. 51 
After this episode, the Viet Minh began to expand its 
activities. Viet Minh cadres, following the slogan "Destroy 
the granaries, solve the danger of hunger," led peasants in 
49 Khanh, 774. 
50 Vo Nguyen Giap, The Military Art of People's War, 
translated by Russell Stetler (New York: Monthly Review Press, 
1970), 68. (Henceforth, Giap) 
51 Ibid. 
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seizing hundreds of rural granaries and freely distributing 
the rice. 52 Their assistance to the starving peasants paid 
big dividends. It enabled them to enlist more members and 
gain broad popular support. Word of these granary seizures 
soon reached the cities and drastically changed the public 
image of the Viet Minh. No longer were they viewed as a 
distant band of poorly equipped peasants." By mid-1945 
Giap had over 10,000 men under arms.� They gave the 
Vietnamese people hope that true independence for their 
country was a possibility. 
Thus, at the time of the Japanese coup against the 
French, the Viet Minh was the best known, best organized and 
strongest resistance group in Vietnam. The Chinese had even 
used it for intelligence operations. This fact was 
certainly known to the Americans, in particular to their 
intelligence organization, the oss, which had extensive 
Chinese connections. Here was the beginning of the link 
between the Americans and the Viet Minh. 
52 Khanh, 776. 
53 b'd I 1 • , 776. 
� G1ap, 21. 
CHAPTER VI 
THE ass AND HO CHI MINH 
Prior to Pearl Harbor, the United states had no 
coordinated intelligence gathering activities and no agency 
that carried out secret operations. While the Army and Navy 
had i�telligence corps, they were, for the most part, 
limited in function. Their capability to collect 
strategic intelligence or plan secret operations was 
virtually nil. 
Shortly before the attack on Pearl Harbor, President 
Roosevelt had asked William J. "Wild Bill" Donovan, a 58 
year old World War I Congressional Medal of Honor winner, to 
draft plans for the creation of an intelligence service for 
the United states. On July 11, 1941, the Office of 
the Coordinator of Information (COI) came into existence, 
and Roosevelt appointed "Wild Bill" its head. On June 13, 
1942, the CCI was renamed the Office of Strategic Services 
(OSS). Its purpose was to plan and carry out such special 
services as collection of foreign intelligence, espionage, 
sabotage, "black" or counterpropaganda, guerilla warfare and 
other clandestine activities under the direction of the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff. 1
Donovan, as it turned out, did not operate by the book. 
Instead, he stressed independent action and improvisation as 
1 R. H. Smith, 1. 
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the modus operandi of the oss. He gave his men great 
freedom of maneuver and then supported them to the hilt.2
The OSS Chinese base was the result of a feud between 
Donovan and General Douglas MacArthur, who had served 
together in World War I. The origin of the bad blood 
between the two men is unknown, but MacArthur may have 
been envious or jealous of the fact that Donovan had won 
every major medal that a soldier can be awarded for combat. 
When the COI was in its infancy in the fall of 1941, 
MacArthur was outspoken in his opposition to an intelligence 
service headed by Donovan. A few months later, Donovan sent 
Colonel Warren Clear, an intelligence officer and Japanese 
specialist, to the South Pacific to explore the 
establishment of a COI espionage network in that theater of 
operations. For some reason Clear ran afoul of MacArthur 
and gave Donovan's fledgling operation a bad name.3
To make up for Clear's failure, Donovan sent Professor 
Joseph Hayden to make amends in December 1942. But this was 
a gaffe on Donovan's part. Hayden had published a book, 
entitled The Philippines, that was highly critical of 
MacArthur's prewar defense plan for the Philippines. Hayden 
2 Ibid., 5-6. According to Smith in Chapter 1 former 
members of the oss read like a Who's Who of Twentieth Century 
American History - Stewart Alsop, Lester Armour (of the meat 
packing family), David Bruce, Ralph Bunche, Julia Child, C. 
Douglas Dillon, Allen Dulles, Arthur Goldberg, Paul Mellon, Walt 
Rostow, and Arthur Schlesinger Jr. 
3 Ibid., 250. 
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was therefore unwelcome, and besides that, he learned 
MacArthur's intelligence aides had already established their 
own intelligence network in the Pacific and wanted nothing 
to do with Donovan's oss. MacArthur refused to discuss the 
matter with Hayden who, not unexpectedly, returned to 
Washi�gton empty handed.4
The oss did attempt to penetrate MacArthur's theater of 
operations, but the lone operative who made it to 
the Philippines was captured, not by the enemy, but by 
MacArthur, and was sent home. Thus, MacArthur had 
effectively banned the oss from working in his South 
Pacific area of operations. Donovan's exclusion from it 
forced him to establish a Chinese base for his Asian 
operations. 5
In April 1943 a joint secret service, known as the 
Sino-American Cooperative Organization {SACO), was created 
between the U.S. and the Kuomintang. Donovan reluctantly 
agreed to this relationship because it met with Roosevelt's 
approval and Chiang Kai-shek had insisted on this 
method of Allied cooperation. Under the directorship of 
Tai Li, who was said to control over 300,000 agents in China 
and every foreign nation where there were Chinese nationals, 
SACO was to engage in espionage, guerrilla training, 
radio interception, and sabotage. The Chinese agreed to 
4 Ibid., 251. 
5 Ibid., 250-251. 
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furnish the manpower and facilities while the U.S. provided 
the weapons and supplies.6 SACO's headquarters was 
established in Chungking, the Nationalist capital during the 
war. OSS relations with the Chinese were cool because no 
one trusted Tai Li whose operation was like the Gestapo's.7
Later on the OSS moved its headquarters to Kunming, where 
Chennault had his command. 
American intelligence efforts in Indochina began with 
the GBT or the "Gordon Group." GBT was an acronym derived 
from the last names of three men - Laurence Laing Gordon, 
Harry V. Bernard, and Frank ("Frankie") Tan. 8 To start 
with, the leader of the group, Gordon, was a British subject 
born in Canada who owned a coffee plantation in Kenya before 
beginning a career in international oil. At the 
beginning of the war, he directed operations for Cal­
Texaco in Haiphong. He moved to California shortly after 
the Japanese occupation, but in early 1941 Cal-Texaco asked 
him to return to Southeast Asia to look after its interests. 
The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor took place, however, 
before his departure and Cal-Texaco was forced to infiltrate 
him into Vietnam. Sir William Stephenson (later known as 
"Intrepid"), who was the head of the British Security 
Coordination Office provided him with a cover. Stephenson 
6 Ibid., 245, 251-252. 
7 Ibid., 248. 
8 Patti, 44-45. 
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was operating secretly out of New York City, with official 
sanction from J. Edgar Hoover and the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation. Gordon was recruited into the British Secret 
Service and ordered to New Delhi. There, on instructions 
from the War Office in London, he was secretly commissioned 
as a_captain in military intelligence. He was assigned the 
job of setting up an intelligence network in Indochina with 
the help of the French military mission in Chungking. The 
Chinese authorized him to operate out of Lungching in 
Kwangsi Province, which was adjacent to the Tonkin border 
and had many access routes into Indochina. Under the guise 
of a free-lancing oil agent, Gordon traveled throughout 
Cochinchina, Annam, and Tonkin. Within a year Gordon was 
joined by the other two men, both Americans. Frank 
(''Frankie") Tan was a Bostonian of Chinese extraction, and 
Harry v. Bernard had worked for Cal-Texaco in Saigon but was 
also a tobacco merchant for British firms.9
By 1943 they had managed to establish a radio network 
and listening posts throughout Indochina. Once they were in 
full operation they began to make a substantial contribution 
to Chinese intelligence. They were also indispensable to 
Chennault's Fourteenth Air Force and various U.S. Navy 
aviation units. This network provided intelligence on 
transporters, industry, shipping and airfields. By the end 
of 1944, the Fourteenth Air Force was providing most of the 
9 Ibid. 
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group's operating funds as well as more modern and powerful 
transmitters for its Vietnamese radio net.10 The Japanese
coup against the French on March 9, 1945, resulted in the 
disruption of this group. Further efforts by the United 
States were necessary to obtain intelligence on Japanese 
activities. 
Meanwhile after the coup, the Allies realized that they 
had to cultivate new avenues of clandestine communications 
in Indochina if their plans against the Japanese in China 
and the Pacific were to succeed. For this they had to 
rely on the oss office in China, which was quickly 
authorized to use "any and all resistance groups" in 
Indochina.11 The Viet Minh was an organization that could
supply information on the scale desired. Also, it had 
shown its capability to rescue downed Allied pilots. 
In late 1944 an American aircraft on a mission was shot 
down over Cao Bang in northern Tonkin. The pilot, a 
Lieutenant Shaw, parachuted into the jungle and was rescued 
by the Viet Minh. They took him to meet Ho on the Chinese 
10 Ronald H. Spector, Advice and Support: The Early Years 
1941-1960 {Center of Military History, United States Army, 
Washington, D. c.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1983), 27. 
[Henceforth, Spector] 
11 Patti, 57 & 544; he quotes from OSS: Letter, Hqrs USFCT 
[Headquarters us Forces, China Theater], dated 20 March 1945; 
subject, "Intelligence Activities and Aid to Resistance Groups in 
French Indo-China"; from Mervin E. Gross, B/Gen. [Brigadier 
General], GSC [General Staff Corps], Act'g C/S [Acting Chief of 
Staff], by command of M/Gen. [Major General] Chennault, to OSS-CT 
[OSS-China Theater], APO 879. 
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border. Ho, seeing his opportunity, decided to escort Shaw 
to Kunming. At the border, the Chinese refused to allow him 
to accompany Shaw, although Ho was eventually permitted 
entry into China. When he arrived in Kunming, Ho got in 
touch with the oss.u 
In looking to the Americans for help, Ho secretly went 
to the office of Colonel Paul Helliwell, who was the Chief, 
Secret Intelligence branch, ass-Kunming on four separate 
occasions (late in 1944 and early in 1945). Ho offered to 
give the OSS intelligence, to engage in sabotage against the 
Japanese and to rescue downed Allied pilots in return for 
arms and ammunition. His proposals were rejected. At that 
time, the OSS had a policy of refusing aid to Communists 
because they were considered to be a possible source of 
postwar trouble.13 Ho kept on trying. Finally, in early 
March, upon Helliwell's orders, Ho received six new pistols 
and twenty thousand rounds of ammunition just before he 
departed for Tonkin.14 Helliwell later claimed that he had 
12 King c. Chen, Vietnam and China: 1938-1954 {Princeton 
(NJ]: Princeton University Press, 1969), 92-93. (Henceforth, 
Chen] 
" Shaplen, 33. 
14 Some accounts say the pistols were either .38 caliber or 
.45 caliber. For example, Helliwell, in a letter to Bernard Fall 
dated October 14, 1954 (in The Two Vietnams, 100 & 457 n. 29), 
stated "the only arms or ammunition which were ever given by 
OSS/China to Ho were six .38 caliber revolvers." But Patti, who 
had access to official documents, states "In early March 
Helliwell authorized the issuance from OSS stock of six new Colt 
.45 automatic pistols. " Patti, 545 n. 19. Fenn, who recruited 
Ho, refers to "six new Colt .45 automatic pistols in their 
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given these arms to Ho as a token of appreciation for his 
rescue of three downed American flyers. He refused, 
however, to send any more arms to the Viet Minh because Ho 
refused to give assurances that he would not use them 
against the French. 15
On March 17, 1945, Ho met with OSS agent Charles Fenn 
at the Indochina Cafe on Chin-Pi Street in Kunming. The two 
worked out details by which Ho would set up intelligence 
listening posts using ass-supplied radios. Ho, who was 
given the code name "Lucius," also agreed to rescue downed 
American flyers, supply information on "Japanese troops in 
Indochina, note trends in agriculture, and report on 
typhoons, floods, and other disasters. 1116
It is worth noting that Ho was ultimately responsible 
for the rescue of 17 American airmen.17 On two occasions, 
an airstrip located in the remote valley of Dien Bien Phu, 
later to be the scene of the climactic battle against the 
original wrappings" and further states "As AGAS had none in stock 
we got these from oss. I rather think this is how it came about 
that an OSS officer later reported supplying Ho with 'six .38 
revolvers' at one of his 'several meetings in South China.'" 
Fenn, 79 & n. 9. 
15 Shaplen, 33. 
16 Chen, 93. 
· 17 Lloyd Shearer. "When Ho Chi Minh Was an Intelligence Agent 
for the U.S." Parade Magazine, 18 March 1973, 8. [Henceforth, 
Shearer]. 
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French in 1954, was used to smuggle out Allied flyers.18
During one of his meetings with Fenn, Ho asked to be 
introduced to General Chennault, the commander of U.S. Army 
Air Forces in China who had created the American Volunteer 
Group {AVG), best known as the Flying Tigers, to combat 
Japan�se air forces in China. Fenn agreed to arrange an 
introduction but only if Ho agreed not to ask him for 
anything - neither supplies nor promises of support.� On 
March 29, Ho met Chennault. The General thanked Ho for 
rescuing a downed American pilot {probably Shaw) in 
Indochina and they discussed saving more pilots. As Ho was 
about to leave, he said 
he had a small favor to ask the general . • • •  But all 
Ho wanted was the general's photograph • • . •  In due 
course . . • a folder of eight-by-ten glossies (were 
produced]. "Take your pick," says Chennault. Ho takes 
one and asks would the general be so kind as to sign 
it? . • • .  Chennault writes across the bottom, "Yours 
Sincerely, Claire L. Chennault."m 
Ho later used this photograph to convince skeptical 
Vietnamese nationalists that he was backed by the United 
States. 
On April 27, 1945, Ho met Major Archimedes Patti, an 
oss operative, at the village of Chiu Chou Chieh, about 6 
miles outside of Chinghsi. Patti would later be the 
18 Bernard B. Fall, Hell In A Very Small Place: The Siege Of 
Dien Bien Phu {New York: Da Capo, 1986), 23. 
19 Fenn, 77. 
20 Ibid., 78-79. 
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commander of the oss contingent that flew to Hanoi after 
Japan's surrender. Patti was the son of an Italian-American 
attorney in New York who was a political associate of 
General Donovan. In their first conversation Ho described 
to Patti how difficult life in Tonkin had become because 
of the widespread famine. Ho's sincerity impressed 
Patti, who felt that "he could be trusted as an ally against 
the Japanese. 1121 At this meeting Ho argued that 
American aid in the form of communication equipment, 
weapons, and American instructors to train the Viet Minh 
would be of great help to his resistance movement. He did 
not, however, directly ask for such aid or commitment from 
the Allies. He merely suggested that it would be helpful 
and, in return, his military-political organization would 
be of great assistance to the Allies.n 
Shortly after his meeting with Patti, Ho returned to 
Vietnam. He set up his military and political headquarters 
at Tan Trao, about 75 miles north of Hanoi. He moved 
quickly to consolidate Viet Minh authority by taking over 
six northern provinces and parts of three more in Tonkin. 
The six were Cao Bang, Bae Can, Lang Son, Ha Giang, Tuyen 
Quang, and Thai Nguyen. 23
Interestingly, approximately 85 percent of this area's 
21 Patti, 86. 
22 Ibid., 87. 
n Ibid., 550 n. 2. 
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population were non-Vietnamese minorities who had never been 
fully pacified by the French. 24 They actively supported the 
Viet Minh and provided food and shelter for the 
guerilla movement. Thus, the Viet Minh were able to 
find ready recruits among the mountainous tribesmen. 25 In 
fact, in 1941 Giap had formed an alliance with Chu Van Tan, 
the tribal leader of the Tho. This montagnard tribe was one 
of the largest of the minority groups and inhabited a 
physically impregnable area that would serve as Giap's 
stronghold. 26
After establishing his base of operations, Ho began to 
send intelligence information to the Americans in Kunming. 
Most of these reports dealt with the location and strength 
of various Japanese units and outlined Japanese 
construction and improvements to former French 
fortifications.v 
In the five months after the March 9 coup to the August 
Revolution, there was a flurry of Viet Minh activity. Ho 
ordered it to expand its guerrilla warfare activities in 
preparation for a general insurrection. Soon after the 
coup, they were able to recruit several thousand formerly 
French-employed Vietnamese militia. The Viet Minh also 
24 Marr, 147; Vu, 410. 
25 Dunn, 13. 
26 Ibid. 
27 Patti, 102. 
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picked up weapons, including machine guns and mortars, from 
the fleeing French. Within a week of the coup, guerilla 
units were making small scale attacks on Japanese 
outposts. 28
The "Viet Minh Committees" from the 1942 period 
were.�upplanted by "People's Revolutionary Committees." 
Wherever possible (mostly in rural areas), they took 
over local governments. The largest area that they 
administered was the "Liberated Zone" consisting of the 
six provinces in northern Tonkin. In all they governed 
over one million people. They set up training schools 
for military, political, and administrative affairs in this 
zone and sent their newly trained cadres to all areas of 
Vietnam.29 The collapse of the French along with Japanese 
pre-occupation with the Pacific war created a vacuum of 
power in the many areas of Vietnam isolated from 
administrative and military control centers.30 The 
"Revolutionary Committees" quickly filled this vacuum. 
These committees also seized Japanese and French-owned 
properties and distributed them to the poor. Taxes were 
abolished, working hours were shortened, and other reforms 
were put into effect. 31
28 Khanh, 775.
29 Ibid., 776.
30 Ibid., 781.
31 Ibid. 
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Patti encountered difficulties with French authorities 
while he was in China and when he transferred to Hanoi. The 
French wanted to reoccupy their former colony at the 
earliest possible moment. Because they suspected the 
Americans of being sympathetic to Ho Chi Minh and his 
followers, they attempted to subvert any American effort 
that ran counter to their plans. Helliwell later said: 
It was perfectly obvious by June of 1945 that the 
French were infinitely more concerned with keeping the 
Americans out of Indochina than they were in defeating 
the Japanese or in doing anything to bring the war to a 
successful conclusion in that area.n 
A note from the French Embassy in China to the American 
Embassy in China, dated January 20, 1945, sums up France's 
postwar plans for Indochina. 
First, France cannot admit any discussion about 
the principal of her establishment in Indochina • . . •
The occupation of Indochina by the Japanese has not 
changed anything in that state of affairs. This 
occupation is nothing but a war incident similar to 
the invasion by the Japanese forces of Malaya, of the 
Netherlands East Indies and Burma • • • •  France intends
to take part in the liberation of those of her 
territories that have been momentarily torn away from 
her by the enemy. 33
Even de Gaulle was fully aware that "new nationalist 
movements were springing up all over the world, with Russia 
and America competing for their adherence. 1134 There can be 
little doubt that France was going to do everything in its 
32 Shaplen, 41. 
33 FRUS - British, 295. 
34 de Gaulle - Salvation, 253. 
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power to reestablish her authority in Indochina as soon as 
possible, and it was not going to let the Americans, or Ho's 
independence movement, stand in her way. 
Meanwhile, Roosevelt had opposed all plans that 
involved the use of French troops to liberate 
Indochina. He even refused to approve "low level 
intelligence and commando-type operations in Indochina 
involving French participation. 1135 In the meantime, the 
U.S. was making plans to reestablish its intelligence 
network inside of Vietnam. These plans would involve direct 
military aid to Ho Chi Minh and his Viet Minh. 
35 Spector, 2 4 . 
CHAPTER VII 
THE DEER TEAM 
In mid-May 1945, a United States Army lieutenant named 
Phelan, a former official of the Chase Manhattan 
Bank, parachuted into Ho's jungle headquarters near the 
villa9e of Kim Lung in northern Tonkin. His mission was to 
establish an underground that would help downed Allied 
flyers escape to freedom.1 Phelan was to act as a liaison 
between the Viet Minh and the oss until the OSS could send a 
team to Ho's base. He lived and worked with Ho for several 
months and found him most helpful toward the Allied cause. 
During that time Ho sent out scouting and raiding parties in 
addition to rescuing Allied soldiers. Phelan recalled 
that Ho was interested in other things: 
He kept asking me if I could remember the language 
of our Declaration [of Independence]. I was a normal 
American, I couldn't. I could have wired up to Kunming 
and had a copy dropped to me, of course, but all he 
really wanted was the flavor of the thing. The more we 
discussed it, the more he actually seemed to know about 
it than I did. As a matter of fact, he knew more about 
almost everything than I did . . • .  2
Unwittingly, Phelan had helped Ho write part of 
1 Shaplen, 28; he refers to Phelan as "John." Fenn confirms 
that "John" was indeed Phelan; Fenn, 81-82. Patti says that a 
young lieutenant named Phelan, from AGAS (Air Ground Aid Section­
China), was assigned to undertake a mission as a liaison officer 
between Ho and the oss; Patti, 126. 
2 Ibid., p. 29; U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations. 
The United States and Vietnam: 1944-1947. A staff study based on 
the Pentagon Papers, study no. 2. 92d Cong., 2d sess., 
(Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1972), 2. 
83 
84 
Vietnam's Declaration of Independence. 
During the first week of June Ho informed the OSS that 
he was prepared to make available up to one thousand well 
trained guerrillas for any plans that the Americans might 
have for use against the Japanese. In response, the oss
launched a plan to train two intelligence teams, code-named 
"Cat" and "Deer," that were to be infiltrated into northern 
Tonkin. Captain (later Major) Charles M. Holland and Major 
Allison K. Thomas were chosen to head the two teams.3 
In the late afternoon of July 16, a team commanded by 
Major Thomas parachuted into the vicinity of Kim Lung. The 
Americans under Thomas were Sergeant William Zeilski, a 
radio operator, and Private First Class Henry A. Prunier, a 
French and Annamese interpreter. The team included a French 
contingent consisting of a Lieutenant Montfort and two 
Vietnamese sergeants in the French army, Logos and Phac.4 
The French officer was included in the team because of 
French pressure. On May 30, the French forces in China, 
with oss approval, had launched a major intelligence 
gathering operation coded named "PAKHOI" (after the South 
China seaport of that name which is now called Peihai). 5
3 Patti, 107 & 125. 
4 U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations. Causes, 
Origins and Lessons of the Vietnam War. Hearings, 92d Congress., 
2d sess., (Washington, D. c.: GPO, 1972), 251. (Henceforth, 
Causes] 
5 Patti, 106-107. 
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It involved two patrol boats supported by motor-junks, all 
manned by French crews. Operating in the northern area of 
the Gulf of Tonkin, mostly outside of Haiphong, they watched 
the coast and "began to transmit (with oss radios) valuable 
Japanese shipping information and assisted our [U.S.] naval 
coas:tal team in taking soundings . • . •  116 The OSS had also
agreed with General Sabattier to train some French and 
Vietnamese troops in Chinghsi, China for use with 
intelligence operations such as the Cat and Deer Teams. 
When the French troop commander, a Major Courthlac, arrived 
at the Chinese training area, he "demanded that oss pay his 
troops and also provide funds for their rations."7 This was 
not part of the OSS agreement with Sabattier. Major Thomas, 
who was in charge of the training, had no funds for such a 
demand and refused Courthlac's demands. The French then 
stopped transmitting PAKHOI intelligence information. To 
induce the French to resume their transmission of 
intelligence, the oss had to agree that Frenchmen would 
accompany any oss team parachuted into Tonkin. Thus, 
Montfort went with the Deer Team. The French also agreed to 
pay for the troop training at Chinghsi.8 
Upon landing Thomas later reported that 
We were first greeted by [NAME DELETED] of AGAS and 
6 Ibid. 
7 Ibid., 107. 
8 Ibid. 
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by [NAME DELETED] the boy from Boston, and employed 
by GBT • • • •  I was then escorted to Mr. Hoe [sic], one
of the big leaders of the VML (Viet Minh League) Party. 
He speaks excellent English but is very weak 
physically. 9 
Thomas also noted that the Viet Minh had hoisted signs in 
English welcoming the group to Ho's headquarters. Although 
the Deer team tried to disguise Lieutenant Montfort's 
identity as a Frenchman, because they feared that the 
Vietnamese might harm him, he was immediately recognized by 
one of the Viet Minh who had served under him in the French 
colonial army at Cao Bang in northern Tonkin. Ho told 
Thomas that "it would be impossible for Lt. Montfort, the 
French officer, to stay, nor would any more French be 
welcome. 1110 Several days later one of the French army 
sergeants, Phac, was identified by a Viet Minh as a member 
of the pro-Chinese Nationalist Party (VNQDD). The Viet Minh 
detained him. On July 30 Montfort and the two Vietnamese 
sergeants were escorted to a nearby village to join twenty 
other French refugees. Montfort led them all on foot back 
to China. This incident did not alter the friendly 
9 Causes, 244. Quote from Copy of OSS Report. After Action 
Report no. 1, dated 17 July 1945 (Kim Lung, Tonkin); received at 
Kunming 27 July 1945; from "Deer" to "Chow." Patti says that 
Lieutenant Phelan parachuted into Tonkin where he was met by 
Frankie Tan of the GBT Group; Patti, 126. Tan, as noted earlier, 
came from Boston and is the person referred to in the second 
deletion. Phelan is most likely the person referred to in the 
first deletion. 
10 Ibid., 257. Quote from oss Report on the Deer Mission, 
dated 17 September 1945, part VI, "Life in FIC [French Indochina] 
from arrival of Advance Party to arrival of remainder of team." 
Entry of 17 July. 
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relationship between the Americans and the Viet Minh.11
According to Henry Prunier, when the Deer team first 
arrived, "Ho was dying of dysentery and malaria. We did 
what we could to keep him alive that first week. 1112 Thomas 
radioed the oss and asked for a medic to be included with 
the final contingent of the Deer team that was to be dropped 
into Ho's headquarters a few days later. On July 29 the 
group arrived. It was led by Captain Charles M. Holland 
and Lieutenant Rene Defourneaux. It included Staff 
Sergeant Lawrence Vogt, a weapons instructor, Sergeant Aaron 
Squires, a field photographer, and Private First Class Paul 
Hoagland, the medic. Lieutenant Defourneaux was born and 
grew up in France before moving to New York. He had been a 
U.S. Army intelligence officer since 1943.13 Hoagland, who 
had received his training aboard a Swedish prisoner-exchange 
ship in the early days of the war, immediately began to 
treat Ho because his diagnosis was that "such a fever had to 
be caused by either malaria, dengue or dysentery, or a 
combination of all three - plus God only knows what other 
mysterious Oriental diseases."w He administered quinine, 
11 Patti, 128. 
12 Henry A. Prunier, "City Man Helped Train Guerrillas of Ho 
Chi Minh." Interview by Raymond P. Girard. (Worcester [MAJ The 
Evening Gazette, 14-15 May 1968) (Henceforth, Prunier interview.] 
13 Causes, 251; Rene Defourneaux, "Secret Encounter with Ho 
Chi Minh." [As told to James Flowers] (Look, 9 August 1966), 32-
33. (Henceforth, Defourneaux] 
M Defourneaux, 32. 
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sulfa drugs and other medicines to the ailing Vietnamese 
leader. The treatment was effective. Ho was on his feet 
within ten days. He had many conversations with Defourneaux 
over the next three months. Ho revealed that he had spent 
time in New York City and Boston. He told Prunier that he 
had worked as a waiter in Boston. Prunier recalled that Ho 
thought that the United States would help him in 
throwing out the French and in establishing an 
independent country • . . •  He was convinced that 
America was for free, popular governments all over the 
world; that it opposed colonialism in all its 
forms • • . •  he seemed sincere in his desire to have 
our help . . . • He knew American history well, and he 
would talk about American ideals and how he was sure 
America would be on his side • 15
In speaking about America's colonial record, Ho told 
Defourneaux, 
I have always been impressed with your country's 
treatment of the Philippines. You kicked the Spanish 
out and let the Filipinos develop their own country. 
You were not looking for real estate, and I admire you 
for that.16
In a later conversation with Defourneaux, Ho pleaded for 
American assistance stating: 
Will the United States intercede for me when the French 
return to Vietnam? . . • •  your diplomats speak of 
helping people with self-determination. Am I any 
different from Nehru, Quezon - even your George 
Washington? Was not Washington considered a 
revolutionary? I, too, want to set my people free .17
During the next four weeks Thomas and his 
u Prunier interview.
M Defourneaux, 33.
17 Ibid., 33.
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American specialists spent their time training about two 
hundred future leaders of the Viet Minh in the use of the 
latest American weapons and guerilla tactics. Vo Nguyen 
Giap, who had become the Viet Minh's master military 
strategist and tactician, personally handpicked this elite 
group of soldiers for the specialized training . 18 The 
Americans supplied the Viet Minh with carbines, M-l's, 
tommyguns, bazookas, mortars, and grenades. They taught 
them how to blow up bridges and disassemble railroad 
tracks . 19 Patti remarked "Some of us may have suspected 
that in the future the weapons and training might be used 
against the French, but no one dreamed that they would ever 
be used against Americans. 1120 According to Prunier, 
it wasn't very long before we had our men firing 
mortars like experts. They had an uncanny ability to 
learn and adapt. They learned to pull a rifle apart 
and put it together again after being shown only a 
couple of times. 21
While the Americans were training the Viet Minh, Ho 
tried to keep his options open for a reconciliation with the 
French. On July 18, Thomas radioed the OSS and requested 
that they relay a message to the French in Kunming that Ho 
was willing to meet with a high ranking French official to 
18 Patti, 129. 
19 Prunier interview. 
20 Patti, 129. 
21 Prunier interview. 
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see what the French might be willing to offer. 22 Ho 
particularly wanted to talk to a senior official about de 
Gaulle's December 8, 1943, Algiers speech in which the 
General said: 
To these people who have affirmed their national 
feeling and sense of political responsibility, France 
intends to give a new political order within the French 
community; in the framework of the Indochinese federal 
organization, the freedoms of the different countries 
will be extended and consecrated.n 
Ho also wanted clarification of a broad non-committal 
declaration that the Ministry of Colonies had issued on 
March 24, 1945, concerning the future of Indochina. 
This declaration, which had been published on March 25, 
1945, in the Journal Officiel de la Republique Franqaise, 
Ordonnances et Decret, stated that, after the war, the 
five countries which make up the Indochinese federation 
(Tonkin, Annam, Cochinchina, Cambodia, and Laos) would 
be returned to France and form with France and the 
other members of the commonweal th a "Fran union. 1124
This declaration did not mention independence but did 
enumerate some reforms and promised Vietnam a special place 
in the organization of the French Union. On this occasion, 
however, the French failed to respond to Ho's request for a 
meeting. 25
On July 25, Ho again expressed a desire to talk with 
22 Patti, 128.
23 Buttinger, 302.
24 Patti, 550 n. 9.
25 Ibid., 129.
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the French. He was allowed to radio a request to the French 
government which outlined a five-point program of reforms. 
The terms that Ho proposed were as follows: 
We the V.M.L. request the following points be made 
public by the French and incorporated into the future 
policy of French Indo-China. 
1. That there be universal suffrage to elect a
parliament for the governing of the country, that there
be a French Governor-General as President until such
time as independence be granted us, that he chose a
cabinet or group of advisors acceptable to that
parliament. Exact powers of all these officers may be
discussed in the future.
2. That independence be given this country in not
less than five years and not more than ten.
3. That natural resources of the country be returned
to the people of the country by just payment to the
present owners, and that France be granted economic
concessions.
4. That all freedoms outlined by the United Nations
will be granted to the Indochinese.
5. That the sale of opium be prohibited.
We hope that these conditions may be acceptable to
the French government. 26
Unfortunately, both of these messages went unanswered and 
unacknowledged. The intransigence of the French was to cost 
them dearly in the future. Undoubtedly, Ho was trying to 
keep all of his options open to ensure the future 
independence of Vietnam. The French, however, were not 
interested in these proposals, and "No one in Kunming had 
the authority to accept these or any other terms. 1127
Not having heard from the French, Ho felt he had no 
choice but to forge ahead with his plans for an independent 
Vietnam. His chance came when the Japanese surrendered on 
26 Ibid., 129. 
27 Hammer , 12 9 . 
August 15. The outcome was the August Revolution. 
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CHAPTER VIII 
THE AUGUST REVOLUTION 
Ho was hardly ready for the sudden end of the war. It 
came in the wake of the dropping of atom bombs on Hiroshima 
and Nagasaki at the beginning of August 1945. Nevertheless, 
he moved quickly to consolidate power in Hanoi, Hue, and 
Saigon. He realized that he had to show the Allies that 
his independence movement was both legitimate and strong. 
Thus, his main aim from August 6, the day the first bomb was 
dropped on Hiroshima, was the immediate seizure of power by 
the Viet Minh. To that end he sent out a call for a 
conference of Viet Minh party delegates and political 
leaders. By August 13, the day that news of Japan's offer 
to surrender reached Vietnam, most of the delegates had 
arrived at Tan Trao. That evening a National Insurrection 
Committee headed by Giap came into being. It issued 
Military Order Number 1 which proclaimed the surrender of 
the Japanese Fascists and mandated a general insurrection 
and called "on Viet Minh troops and cadres to seize power 
before the arrival of Allied troops."1
The first People's National Congress convened on August 
16, the day after the surrender. It consisted of over sixty 
delegates who represented almost every political 
organization in Indochina including members of minority 
1 Vu, 418; Dunn, 16. 
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races. It approved the resolution for the general 
insurrection. In the next two days 
it adopted a ten-point program, a national flag • • •  a 
national anthem, and elected the Viet Nam Committee for 
National Liberation, headed by Ho Chi Minh as 
President, to act as the provisional government pending 
national elections.2
Ho convinced the congress to adopt a policy that called for 
the Viet Minh to seize control from the Japanese and Kim's 
puppet government before the arrival of Allied troops.3 He 
also persuaded it to welcome Allied forces that were coming 
to disarm the Japanese troops. Ho showed off General 
Chennault's autographed photo and claimed he had American 
backing for his cause. He also distributed the six pistols 
that Helliwell had given him to various Viet Minh leaders. 
To them, these pistols seemed to indicate Ho had U.S. 
support. 
Meanwhile, the local "People's Revolutionary 
Committees," which were located in the villages and counties 
of almost every province in North and Central Vietnam, took 
over the political and administrative networks and started 
to exercise power.4 The transfer of power was accomplished 
with ease. It was rapid, and peaceful with virtually no 
bloodshed. In many places, the local leaders were so eager 
2 Patti, 135. 
3 Ibid., 135; he quotes from Nguyen Khac Vien, The Long 
Resistance (1858-1975) (Hanoi: Foreign Languages Publishing 
House, 1975), 100. 
4 Khanh, 761. 
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to assume power that they acted without instructions from 
the ICP. Rural areas were taken over first, and then the 
Viet Minh moved into the cities. The Viet Minh audaciously 
presented itself as the united front of all nationalists 
and patriots, and it fearlessly declared that it was the 
Vietnamese arm of the victorious Allied forces. 5
Within ten days, the Viet Minh had jurisdiction over 
most of Vietnam. Hanoi was secured on August 19, now 
commemorated as the day of the "Success of the 
Revolution." The Kim government collapsed. In Hanoi the 
Japanese permitted the Viet Minh to occupy all important 
public buildings with the exception of the Bank of 
Indochina, which the Japanese Army still guarded. Hue, the 
old imperial capital, was taken over on August 23, and Bao 
Dai was asked to resign. On August 25 he gave up his 
throne, assumed the name of Citizen Vinh Thuy, and pledged 
his support of the Viet Minh regime. His abdication 
was a godsend for the Viet Minh. In turning over the 
imperial seal and the lineaments of his office, Bao Dai 
effectively demonstrated to the tradition-minded Vietnamese 
that an important historical shift of power had taken place, 
and that the new Democratic Republic of Viet Nam had the 
mandate of heaven. 6 Saigon was occupied on August 25. 
5 Buttinger, 296. 
6 Sacks, 153; he quotes from Tran Huy Lieu, "The Emperor's 
Golden sword," in Factual Records of the Vietnam August 
Revolution, by the Viet Nam Cultural Association for National 
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Never before in its history had Vietnam seemed so united. 
The Japanese were the only force that could prevent the Viet 
Minh from taking power, and they remained neutral. Their 
inaction made the victory of the Viet Minh possible. 7
On August 16 the Deer team, which had finished training 
the Viet Minh, left with a unit under the command of Giap. 
The delegates to the party Congress, which had convened that 
same day, were further impressed by Ho's "apparent" American 
military assistance. In this deceptive manner Ho's forces 
were able to present "themselves as the Vietnamese arm of 
the victorious Allies. 118 The Deer team accompanied 
Giap's troops all the way to Hanoi located about 75 miles 
south of Tan Trac. Some forty miles from Hanoi, General 
Giap and his troops, along with Thomas and his Deer team, 
engaged in a battle with the Japanese at Thai Nguyen. They 
were still clashing with the Japanese on August 23, a week 
after Japan surrendered, because the Japanese troops in the 
field had not received word that the war was over. 9 In 
fact, the Japanese did not surrender Thai Nguyen to the Viet 
Minh until August 28. 
In July 1945 the United States, Great Britain, and the 
Liberation {Hanoi: Foreign Languages Publishing House, no date), 
25-32.
7 Buttinger, 298. 
8 R. H. Smith, 335; Buttinger 312. 
9 Patti, 167; Boettcher, 72-73. 
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Soviet Union had met at Potsdam. They agreed that Indochina 
would be divided at the 16th parallel to facilitate the 
Japanese surrender. The Chinese army was to occupy the area 
north of the parallel and the British the southern area. 
France was not in a position to object to this plan because 
of her weak status with the Allies. Nevertheless de Gaulle 
opposed the Potsdam agreement. He wanted French troops to 
liberate the French colonies. He believed that China 
sympathized with the Viet Minh and had no wish to permit 
restoration of French control in Indochina. 10 In speaking 
with Truman, he said France was "not eager to see British 
troops replace the Japanese in the southern part of 
Indochina or Chinese troops in the north."11 But he also
knew that "our direct administration could not be 
re-established. 1112 As it turned out, however, the British 
reoccupation of Cochinchina insured France's return to the 
south. Britain was also a colonial power and was 
sympathetic to France's desire to retain her colony. 
Although Ho had known Stalin in the early 1920s, the 
Soviet Union was not interested in Indochina's fate after 
the war and did nothing to aid Ho or the Viet Minh. 
According to McLane, no reliable evidence has come to light 
showing Soviet involvement "in any way in the wartime 
10 Sullivan, 40. 
11 de Gaulle - Salvation, 243. 
12 b. d I 1. . ,  261. 
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strategies of the Vietminh or in Communist tactics during 
the August uprising. n 13
In fact, United states intelligence agencies at the 
time could find no evidence linking Ho to Soviet Communism. 
In July 1948, a report of the Intelligence and Research 
Division of the United States state Department stated that 
the 
Dept has no evidence of direct link between Ho and 
Moscow but assumes it exists, nor is it able evaluate 
amount pressure or guidance Moscow exerting. We have 
impression Ho must be given or is retaining large 
degree of latitude.M 
In the fall of 1948 the same state Department office 
conducted a survey of Communist influence in Southeast Asia. 
Confirmation of Kremlin-directed conspiracies was found in 
virtually all countries except Vietnam. The report's 
evaluation was most telling. It stated 
If there is a Moscow-directed conspiracy in Southeast 
Asia, Indochina is an anomoly [sic] so far. 
Possible explanations are: 
1. No rigid directives have been issued by
Moscow.
2. The Vietnam government considers that it has
no rightist elements that must be purged. 
3. The Vietnam Communists are not subservient to
the foreign policies pursued by Moscow.
4. A special dispensation for the Vietnam
government has been arranged in Moscow.
Of these possibilities, the first and fourth seem most 
likely. is
When the war ended, the Soviets were more interested in 
0 McLane, 266-267. 
14 U.S. - Vietnam Relations, Book I, Part I.A, A-5. 
IS Ibid., A-6. 
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their own internal affairs and in Eastern Europe. The 
Soviet Union needed time for economic reconstruction 
and political stabilization. From a strategic standpoint, 
Stalin feared a revitalized Germany, which motivated him to 
build a buffer zone along the Soviet Union's East European 
border. He also wanted to cultivate alliances with western 
European nations. 16 His main aims in the Far East were to 
recover territories lost to Japan during the Russo-Japanese 
War of 1904-1905, and to obtain reparations from the 
Japanese. In China; he supported a coalition government 
of the Kuomintang and the Communists. He appeared to be 
more interested in dismantling Japanese industrial plants 
in Manchuria than in helping fellow Communists like Mao 
Tse-Tung, the leader of the Chinese Communist Party.17
Concerning the rest of Asia, Stalin was non-committal, 
although he did support Roosevelt's postwar plan that 
Indochina be governed by an international trusteeship .18 By 
and large, the Soviets did not want to take a stand on the 
colonial question after the war because they were too busy 
binding up the wounds inflicted upon them by the Germans. 
Also, Stalin was assiduously courting de Gaulle and did not 
want to antagonize him over the Indochina issue. Thus, with 
a foothold in Cochinchina under British auspices, and Stalin 
16 Vu, 507. 
IT Ibid., 508 & 511. 
18 FRUS - Cairo and Teheran, 4 8 5.
courting de Gaulle, France was assured a good chance of 
recovering her colony. 
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CHAPTER IX 
THE OSS TEAM IN HANOI 
As the war came to an end in August 1945, Allied 
authorities were concerned about the fate of POW's in 
Japanese hands when the war ended. They feared that the 
defeated Japanese might cut off provisions and take 
reprisals. The oss was directed to prepare plans for a 
rescue operation. By late January 1945, it had organized 
commando units known as Mercy Teams that would parachute 
into POW camps after the surrender to "provide for the 
prisoners' safety, prevent any maltreatment, and clear 
nearby airfields for quick air evacuation."1
Patti was in charge of the Mercy Team that landed in 
Hanoi on August 22. He and his team were accompanied by 
Jean Sainteny, chief of M.5, the French intelligence unit in 
Kunming (a division of SLFEO), and four other Frenchmen. 
Sainteny had been a Hanoi banker, a French resistance 
leader, and was the son-in-law of Albert Sarraut, a former 
Governor General of Indochina. After landing at Gia Lam 
Airport, Patti's group was escorted into Hanoi by the 
Japanese. Along the way Patti noticed hundreds of Viet Minh 
flags and huge banners with English slogans that hung from 
the trees. The banners denounced French imperialism 
and proclaimed "Independence or Death," "Vietminh for 
1 Patti, 141. 
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the Vietnamese," "Down with French Imperialism," and 
112,000,000 people died under French domination. 112 
Patti set up his headquarters in the Hotel Metropole. 
As soon as the local Vietnamese learned about the presence 
of the Frenchmen, an unruly and hostile crowd surrounded the 
hotel_, The Japanese commander suggested to Patti that it 
might be best for the Frenchmen to be housed in the Governor 
General's Palace where the Japanese could protect them. 
This was acceptable to Sainteny, who did not realize that, 
once ensconced in his new quarters, he would become a 
virtual prisoner of the Japanese. They refused to let him 
leave the Palace grounds. Later on Sainteny would claim 
that this was an "American plot" to prevent reestablishment 
of French control over Indochina. On September 1, the 
Japanese sentries at the Governor's Palace were replaced by 
Viet Minh guards. Sainteny and his men then became virtual 
captives. 3
As Patti settled in at the Hotel Metropole, Ho "and his 
guerrillas, accompanied by Major Thomas's OSS group, were 
making their triumphant march to Hanoi. "4 After Thomas and 
his men made contact with Patti, they made plans to return 
to China. Before Thomas and his men left, "Ho gave them a 
warm send-off. 'I want to thank each of you for what you 
2 R. H. Smith, 349; Causes, 264. 
3 Patti, 157-158. 
4 R. H. Smith, 349. 
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have done for us,' he said. 'We are truly grateful.' 115 
On August 23 Patti met with General Tsuchihashi to 
discuss the Allied POW's. Tsuchihashi said that he would 
have to consult with Tokyo before allowing Patti to have 
access to them. This took about forty-eight hours. Patti 
first_ visited the Citadel, which housed around four 
thousand French prisoners. Leaving the Citadel, he then 
visited the POW camp located at Gia Lam airport, where all 
the Indian and British POW's were kept. Patti found that 
most of the POW's were in good shape both mentally and 
physically. The condition of POW's in Indochina was better 
than that of others in the Pacific theatre because the 
French people smuggled medicines, food, and other supplies 
into the POW camps. 6 Returning to the Metropole, Patti 
was surprised to learn that an unidentified Frenchman 
had stopped by the hotel and left a note indicating that 
there was an American prisoner at the citadel. They 
subsequently learned that this American, a flight crewman 
downed in 1943, was posing as a Hungarian citizen in the 
French Foreign Legion to escape Japanese detection. Patti 
obtained his release on August 28 and the man was flown home 
several days later.7
On August 26 Patti met with both Ho Chi Minh and Vo 
5 Ibid., 350. 
6 Dunn, 132. 
7 Patti, 177-178. 
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Nguyen Giap in Ho's Hanoi headquarters. Ho brought Patti up 
to date on what was occurring in Hanoi and Saigon. He was 
clearly worried about Sainteny's presence in Hanoi 
and believed it boded ill for his newly established 
Provisional government. He was also concerned about the 
impending arrival of Chinese troops, who would put a 
strain on the meager resources of the country. Patti 
assured Ho that he would forward his concerns to OSS 
headquarters in Kunming.8 
Sainteny asked Patti to set up a meeting with Ho. Ho 
agreed as long as Patti would be present, but he also 
decided to send Giap in his place. The meeting was held on 
August 27 and Sainteny immediately got off on the 
wrong foot. He complained to Giap about the Viet Minh's 
recent stand that France was no longer welcome in Indochina. 
Giap stood up to him and told Sainteny that he did not come 
to the meeting to be lectured, but that he was willing to 
exchange views with the French representative. Sainteny 
stated that France would grant most of the Vietnamese 
requests. When Giap pressed Sainteny for specific 
proposals, however, Sainteny only replied with more 
generalities and vague promises. The meeting ended with 
both sides realizing that their differences could not be 
solved amicably.9 
8 Ibid., 201-202. 
9 Ibid., 208-209. 
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Patti met with Ho again on August 29. At that meeting 
Ho informed Patti that he would proclaim September 2 as 
Independence Day. Ho told Patti that the draft of their 
independence declaration needed some polishing and asked him 
for assistance. Patti was astounded by the opening words, 
which_were copied directly from the American Declaration of 
Independence. He then helped Ho polish the draft, as 
several words from the American Declaration had been 
transposed. 10 
On Independence Day (September 2, the same day that 
Japan signed the formal surrender papers aboard the u.s.s.
Missouri) Patti and his men made their way to Ba Dinh Square 
where the official ceremonies were to take place. Ho had 
invited Patti to sit on the official platform with other 
dignitaries, but Patti declined to do so as he wanted to mix 
with the crowds and be an observer. Ho was introduced and 
stepped up to the microphone. The crowd cheered for several 
minutes before Ho raised his hands and called for silence.u 
He began his now-famous proclamation for Vietnamese 
independence with the following words: 
All men are created equal. The Creator has given us 
certain inviolable Rights; the right to Life, the right 
to be Free, and the right to achieve Happiness.12 
10 Ibid., 223. 
11 Ibid., 249. 
12 Ibid., 250; he notes that this is a literal translation 
and that it may be at variance with that of most historians who 
were not present to hear Ho's delivery, but it is the agreed 
---106 
Ho then paused and asked his listeners: "Do you hear me 
distinctly, fellow countrymen?" The crowd roared back: 
"Yes!" Ho continued: 
These immortal words are taken from the Declaration of 
Independence of the United States of America in 1776. 
In a larger sense, this means that: All the people on 
earth are born equal; All the people have the right to 
live, to be happy, to be free.0
Ho then shifted to the Declaration of the French Revolution 
made in 1791 on the "Rights of Man and the Citizen" and told 
his audience that it "also states: 'All men are born free 
and with equal rights, and must always remain free 
and have equal rights. Those are undeniable truths.' "14 
Ho continued his speech with a castigation of French 
colonialism based on the grievances stated in the American 
Declaration of Independence against colonial rule. He 
proceeded: 
Nevertheless, for more than eighty years, the French 
imperialists, abusing the standard of Liberty, 
Equality, and Fraternity, have violated our Fatherland 
and oppressed our fellow citizens. They have acted 
contrary to the ideals of humanity and justice • 15 
Next, he bitterly denounced the French saying that 
In the field of politics, they have deprived our 
translation of Vietnamese linguists on Patti's staff and that of 
English educated Vietnamese translators present on that occasion. 
13 Ibid. 
14 Chen, Appendix II - Declaration of Independence of the 
Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam, 356; he quotes from Ho Chi Minh, 
Selected Works (Hanoi: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1961, 
Vol. III). 
15 Ibid., 356. 
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people of every democratic liberty. They have enforced 
inhuman laws; they have set up three distinct political 
regimes • • •  to wreck our national unity and prevent 
our people from being united. They have built more 
prisons than schools • • . , fettered public opinion 
. • • , forced us to use opium and alcohol • • •  , 
fleeced us • • •  , impoverished our people • • •  , 
robbed us of our rice fields, our mines, our forests, 
and our raw materials . • • , monopolized the issuing 
of bank notes and the export trade . • .  , invented 
numerous unjustifiable taxes and reduced our people, 
�specially our peasantry, to a state of extreme poverty 
. • . , hampered the prospering of our national 
bourgeoisie; they have mercilessly exploited our 
workers.16
Recognizing prophetically that the French would 
continue to oppose Vietnamese independence, Ho warned his 
people that 
From the autumn of 1940, our country had in fact 
ceased to be a French colony and had become a 
Japanese possession . . • • The truth is that we have 
wrested our independence from the Japanese and not from 
the French. 17
In closing, Ho appealed to the Allies, who had 
acknowledged the principles of self-determination and 
equality of nations at Teheran and San Francisco. "Viet-Nam 
has the right to be a free and independent country - and in 
fact is so already. 1118 
After Ho's speech, Giap spoke to the assembled crowd. 
He knew that the revolution had come too quickly and that it 
had not yet been adequately tested. He understood the 
many divisive tendencies in Vietnamese society, so his 
� Ibid., 356-357. 
17 Ibid., 358. 
18 Ibid., 359. 
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speech stressed unity over and over. He later wrote, "Uncle 
[Ho Chi Minh] always insisted on our paying particular 
attention to the question of national unity. 1119 
As if to highlight the independence ceremony and 
validate to the Vietnamese people that the new Democratic 
Republic of Vietnam had Allied backing, two American fighter 
planes overflew the celebration with their white-starred 
insignia plainly visible. The Viet Minh wasted no time in 
declaring this flyby was proof that the United 
States government supported their regime. The truth, 
however, is that this coincidence was probably brought on by 
pilot curiosity.20
Patti left Hanoi on September 4 for Kunming, where he 
reported on the momentous events of September 2 to his 
superiors. Apparently, no one in the oss paid any attention 
to Ho's Declaration of Independence. Patti returned to 
Hanoi a few days later when, on September 13, he learned 
that the oss was shutting down its operations in Kunming and 
would be moving its headquarters to Shanghai. On September 
25 Patti was informed that President Truman had signed 
Executive Order 9620 terminating the Office of Strategic 
Services effective October 1, 1945.n 
19 Giap, 61. The term "Uncle," used in reference to Ho, was 
an indication of both familiarity and respect. 
20 Dunn, 22. 
21 Patti, 328 & 353. 
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On September 30, his last night in Hanoi, Patti was 
invited to have dinner with Ho. Giap was there but left 
shortly after the meal was over. Ho expressed his 
uneasiness that the United states would stand by and let the 
French reimpose colonial rule over Vietnam. He hoped that 
the United States could restrain the French because 
colonialism was a thing of the past. Ho also expressed 
great concern about the Chinese occupation forces, as he 
feared they would loot Vietnam and exacerbate the country's 
poverty.22
For the first time Ho told Patti about his past. He 
mentioned that he had two brothers and a sister and that he 
had been close to his mother. Their conversation lasted far 
into the night with Ho finally telling Patti that 
the Vietnamese would "long remember the United States as a 
friend and ally."23 Patti included this information in his 
reports. Whether or not it was noticed is unknown. In any 
event, American policy towards Vietnam remained inchoate. 
Patti stated flatly that "Theater headquarters and the 
American Embassy were unimpressed with my early reports on 
the nature and significance of the Viet Minh."M 
n Ibid., 366-370. 
23 Ibid., 374. 
24 Ibid., 125. 
CHAPTER X 
THE OSS TEAM IN SAIGON 
The situation in Cochinchina in the late summer of 1945 
was different from that in the north. In Tonkin the Viet 
Minh's control was unchallenged, but in the south other 
groups were vying for power. Besides the Communist Party, 
there were the Trotskyites, and the pro-Japanese Phuc Quoc 
and Dai Vet. The Cao Dai and Hoa Hao were powerful 
politico-religious sects and were probably the best 
organized of all the political parties, including the Viet 
Minh. They decided to support Ho for two reasons. Both 
realized that the Viet Minh were stronger and had a fear of 
becoming politically isolated. The Communist Party seemed 
to have the best program for Vietnam's future.1
The Viet Minh "welcomed all political elements, 
ethnic groups, national minorities, women, and social 
classes in a democratic front."2 The southern 
Communists, however, resisted any association with non­
Communist parties. Thus, because of the geographical 
separation of Cochinchina, Annam, and Tonkin, the Communist 
Party in the south was somewhat isolated from the Central 
Committee of the Indochinese Communist Party in the north 
during the war years. This changed at the August 13 Tan 
1 Patti, 184. 
2 Ibid. 
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Trao Conference when Ho and his men asserted their control. 3
On August 25, the Viet Minh set up the Committee for 
the South to function as Cochinchina•s first native 
government. It took over power in Saigon swiftly and 
peaceably. Headed by Tran Van Giau, its first aim was to 
main�ain order, as it was determined to make a good 
impression on the Allied representatives expected to 
arrive within the next few days. Both the French and the 
Trotskyites rejected its pleas for peace. The Trotskyites, 
who were hostile towards the Viet Minh, continued to preach 
"immediate and violent revolution" because they were opposed 
to French rule under any guise and felt that Ho Chi Minh had 
betrayed the cause for independence. 4
Meanwhile, the Japanese in Saigon made no effort to 
assist the French in regaining control over their colony. 
They did nothing to prevent the spread of Viet Minh 
authority. Decoux, who was being held in captivity at Loe 
Ninh, about 75 miles north of Saigon, urged General 
Tsuchihashi to release him and his compatriots. He argued 
that only the French could "maintain order, ban arms 
dealing, [and) safeguard the currency. 115 General
Tsuchihashi refused. In the meantime the Japanese released 
arms and equipment to the Viet Minh because they hoped to 
3 Ibid. 
4 R. H. Smith, 337; Patti, 524. 
5 Decoux, 340. 
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provoke fighting between the Vietnamese and the Allies. 6
A seven member oss team arrived in Saigon on September 
2-3, 1945. Its commander was twenty-eight-year-old 
Major A. Peter Dewey, an officer of extraordinarily broad 
experience and accomplishments. His father had been a 
conservative, an anti-New Dealer and an isolationist 
Republican from Chicago. Dewey's father, like Patti's, was 
a friend of "Wild Bill" Donovan. Dewey, fluent in French, 
had fought with the Polish army in France against the 
Germans in 1940. He joined the American army in 1942 and 
served as an intelligence officer in Africa and Arabia. In 
1943 he became a member of the oss while in Algiers. In 
1944 he led a mission behind the lines in southern France 
that led to the capture of 400 Germans. 7
Dewey and his team were on their own. He could expect 
no logistical or military help from the British. His 
primary mission was to free American POW's who were being 
held in the area, but he and the team also had instructions 
to search for air crews that had disappeared in action over 
Indochina, survey American missionary property in Indochina, 
locate and inventory all property of the United States 
government, investigate war crimes against the Allies, 
identify and track down Japanese war criminals, confiscate 
6 F. c. Jones, Japan's New Order in East Asia: Its Rise and
Fall, 1937-45 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1954), 398. 
7 R. H. Smith, 337-338. 
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or microfilm all Japanese documents and code books, and, 
most important, conduct political surveillance for the State 
Department. 8 
After being headquartered on the outskirts of the city 
in an old mansion owned by the President of the Bank of 
Indochina and occupied during the war by a Japanese admiral, 
they quickly located over 4,500 Allied POW's, of which 214 
were Americans. They managed to have the American POW's 
evacuated by September 6. At that time they were ordered to 
"remain in Saigon to 'represent American interests.'" 9
On September 12 the first British troops, Indian 
Gurkhas, arrived in Saigon. A small contingent of French 
paratroopers accompanied them. Many of them wore American 
issue uniforms which made it difficult to distinguish them 
from Americans. SLFEO agents, who had arrived on September 
6 with the British Force 136 from India, met the 
paratroopers and took them directly to the ammunition dumps, 
the port facilities, and military warehouses where they 
relieved the Japanese and took control. The French then 
directed the Japanese prison commander to free several 
hundred Legionnaires, officers, and NCO's. These newly 
freed men were taken to the arsenals, armed, and 
instructed to scatter throughout the city to organize 
8 Patti, 272; R. H. Smith, 338; Spector, 65. 
9 R. H. Smith, 338. 
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French citizens for taking over Saigon. 10
Major General Douglas D. Gracey of the British Army 
arrived in Saigon on September 13 with the rest of his 
troops - 1,800 officers and men. Gracey was a traditional 
British colonial officer. As far as he was concerned, 
Indochina had been a French colony before the war, and he 
was determined to return it to France because colonial 
peoples do not "declare themselves independent without the 
consent of their rulers. 1111 As General Chennault wrote 
several years later, "The British . . .  were determined then 
to uphold the colonial system in the orient and regarded a 
French defeat in Indochina as injurious to their own 
imperial prestige. 1112 Within hours of his arrival, Gracey 
ordered the Japanese to disarm the Vietnamese and to 
dislodge the Committee for the South from the Governor 
General's Palace in Saigon. The French lost no time in 
hoisting the French flag over public buildings. 13
Dewey had been in constant contact with members of the 
Committee for the South since his arrival. He tried to act 
as a liaison between the French and Vietnamese, but the 
French blocked most of his efforts. Negotiations broke 
w Patti, 298-299. 
11 Ibid., 308. 
12 Claire Lee Chennault, Way of a Fighter, edited by Robert 
Holtz (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1949), 342. 
13 Patti, 309. 
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down completely following Gracey•s orders to disarm the 
Vietnamese. Gracey put pressure on Dewey to break off 
meetings with the Committee of the South because the 
Vietnamese might interpret his actions as "evidence of 
official American support for the independence movement. "14 
On September 14 Gracey ordered the oss team to "cease all 
intelligence activities until its mission in Saigon was 
'clarified. '" 15 Dewey ignored this order. 
In response to Gracey's crackdown, the Committee for 
the South called for a general strike on September 17. 
Jean Cedile, the High Commissioner of France for Indochina, 
asked Gracey for permission to arm some 1400 French POW's, 
who had been in prison since the March 9th coup. Gracey 
turned him down. Instead, Gracey ordered the local Japanese 
commander, Field Marshall Terauchi Hisaichi, to take action 
to restore order, even if his troops had to fire upon the 
Vietnamese. Meanwhile, Cedile approached Dewey and asked 
for his good offices in persuading the Viet Minh leaders to 
end the strike. 16 
Dewey met with Giau and others on the night of 
September 18. They told Dewey that it was too late for 
further cooperation. The next day Gracey shut down the 
Vietnamese press. During the ensuing twenty-four hours 
14 Spector, 6 7 . 
15 Ibid. 
16 Patti, 311-312. 
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there were many acts of sabotage, vandalism, plunder, 
and assault. On September 21 Gracey proclaimed martial 
law. Cedile again went to Gracey and appealed for him to 
arm the French POW's. This time Gracey not only agreed but 
also allowed the French POW's to be rearmed. The French 
quietly began to take over the city from the Japanese during 
the afternoon of September 2 2 . 17 
That night, Dewey met with Doctor Pham Ngoc Thach, a 
member of the Executive Committee for the Committee for the 
South and learned that they intended to stage a 
mass demonstration the next day. Dewey cautioned Thach that 
such a demonstration was not permitted under martial law and 
that there might be bloodshed. 18 
The next morning the French began a massacre in the 
city. Cedile's troops reoccupied more public buildings in 
Saigon. As one of the Saigon oss team members noted 
In a pre-dawn attack on September 23, this force looted 
the arsenal and embarked on a program of massacre and 
brutality against the generally defenseless Annamese 
population, secured control over a large part of 
Saigon, and became the nucleus of the French forces 
which were to later arrive. 19
French troops shot down Viet Minh sentries at City Hall. 
Saigon's French colonial population rejoiced at the retaking 
of the city and lost all restraint. Banding together in 
IT Ibid., 314-316. 
18 Ibid., 316. 
19 George Sheldon, "The Status of the Viet Nam," Far Eastern 
Survey, 18 December 1946, 374. 
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gangs, French men and women roamed Saigon's streets in 
search of any Vietnamese who dared to show themselves. No 
one was spared. Hundreds of men, women, and children were 
savagely beaten and many were taken to nearby jails. 20 The 
French and British military stood by without raising a hand 
to stop the rioting. As one OSS officer later reflected, 
"For one who has been there, the conclusion is inevitable 
that the French have learned almost everything under Hitler 
except compassion. 1121 
Dewey tried to see Gracey to protest French behavior, 
but Gracey refused to see him. Cedile told Dewey that the 
rioting was none of his business and that the Americans were 
to blame for the state of affairs. 22 The next day Gracey 
declared Dewey persona non grata and ordered him to leave 
the country as soon as possible. The rest of the oss team 
was allowed to remain in Vietnam. Dewey made arrangements 
to fly to Ceylon on September 26. 23
The Vietnamese reaction to these atrocities was to 
regroup under the leadership of the Viet Minh. They saw no 
alternative but to wage war. Frenchmen were attacked on 
September 24 and many buildings were burned or sacked. The 
20 Patti, 317. 
21 George F. Sheldon, "Communications: The Case For Viet 
Nam," The Commonweal, 7 March 1947, 516-517. 
22 Patti, 317. 
23 Ibid. 
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Viet Minh and their sympathizers blamed members of the Binh 
Xuyen, a gangster-type of political sect, for one 
particularly horrible bloodbath. It was alleged that on 
the night of September 24/25 the Binh Xuyen entered the 
French-Eurasian residential district known as Cite Herault 
located in the north-central section of Saigon and massacred 
more than one hundred and fifty French colonials, mostly 
women and children. An equal number were taken away and 
were later tortured, mutilated, and killed. Although 
Japanese troops guarded the area, they stood aside and let 
the mob pass through because they were sympathetic to 
Vietnamese aspirations for independence. It should be 
noted, however, that the Binh Xuyen seldom engaged in any 
activity that did not return a profit, and this atrocity 
was totally out of character from their usual behavior. 
French intelligence later learned that this slaughter 
was the work of the Trotskyites. At the same time of the 
massacre, the Vietnamese also set up roadblocks around 
Saigon and refused to let any colonials leave. Frenchmen 
who tried to leave the city were shot.24
Dewey's flight out of Saigon was scheduled to depart at 
9:30 A.M. on September 26. Captain Herbert J. Bluechel 
drove Dewey to the airport, where they learned that the 
plane would not leave before noon. About 11:00 A.M. Dewey 
learned that a member of his team, Captain Joseph R. 
� Ibid., 319; Dunn, 203. 
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Coolidge, had been ambushed and wounded the previous 
evening.ll Dewey and Bluechel visited briefly with Coolidge 
at the hospital and returned to the airport around 12:15 
P.M. The plane had not arrived. They decided to return to
OSS headquarters for lunch since it was only a ten minute 
drive.u 
Dewey was driving the jeep when they came upon 
a roadblock about five hundred yards from oss
headquarters. Both men were familiar with the roadblock and 
had negotiated it several times, including that morning when 
they left for the airport. Dewey slowed down to about 8 
miles per hour when, without warning, a hidden machine gun 
opened up on them at point blank range. Dewey was killed 
instantly. He was the first American to die in Vietnam.v 
The jeep overturned and Bluechel scrambled to safety. 
He shot several approaching Vietnamese and ran to oss
headquarters for cover. The Vietnamese attacked the 
Headquarters, which was not flying an American flag, for 
several hours. The telephone lines were cut, so Bluechel 
radioed oss headquarters in Ceylon. It contacted the British 
in Saigon, who sent Gurkhas to reinforce the Americans. The 
Vietnamese then withdrew. Dewey's body was never recovered. 
Bluechel later reported that Dewey 
ll Patti, 320. 
u Ibid.
v causes, 287.
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was ambushed and killed through being mistaken of being 
of a nationality other than American. If the jeep in 
which he was riding at the time of the incident had 
been displaying an American flag, I [Bluechel) feel 
positive that the shots would not have been fired. A 
flag was not being displayed in accordance with verbal 
instructions issued by General Gracey • . • .  � 
Because the French had been issued American uniforms, 
it is most likely that Dewey and Bluechel were mistaken for 
Frenchmen.29 Arthur Krock summed up the irony of his death: 
Lieutenant Colonel Dewey of the Office of strategic 
Services was not meant to perish in the way he did -
from the gunfire of insurgents in a strange land who 
mistook him for a French officer, and therefore a 
symbol of what they consider their oppressor . • . •  
Peter Dewey boldly met every risk which high spirit, 
total absence of physical fear, and hatred of autocracy 
impelled him to seek. He survived these, to be shot 
from ambush by natives whose protest against foreign 
dominion he had examined with the sympathy he felt for 
all who are thus subject. It is one of the first 
American casualties in the bodeful era of peace-making 
that has released passions as violent as those of 
war. 30
The oss moved its headquarters into downtown Saigon to 
the Hotel Continental shortly after Dewey's death. Navy 
Lieutenant James R. Withrow, Jr., a veteran of OSS 
operations in India, took over. Shortly after his arrival, 
28 Ibid., 284. This is a quote from OSS Document MLB-2739-A 
dated September 30, 1945. 
29 Peter M. Dunn, who is very pro-British and pro-French, 
claims in his book, The First Vietnam War, that the French were 
"outfitted by the British, as contemporary photos show" (p. 215), 
but offers no other proof to corroborate his assertion. Dunn is 
the only source I have found that differs from other contemporary 
accounts, which state that the French were in American uniforms. 
30 Arthur Krock, "The Late A. Peter Dewey," The New York 
Times, 3 October 1945, 18. 
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the French were reinforced by regular units under the 
command of General Jacques Leclerc and began the reconquest 
of Cochinchina. The oss merely observed the reconquest and 
reported the results to Washington. Truman disbanded the 
OSS less than a week after Dewey's death, and there was 
little the team could do but await orders to return to the 
United States. George Sheldon, a 25-year old oss officer 
stationed in Saigon, was impressed by the Vietnamese 
resistance. Later he wrote, "The Vietnamese have had French 
rule and they have had their own, and their stand is that 
'France can make Viet Nam a cemetery, but not a colony. ' 1131
The day after Dewey's death, Gracey arrested the 
Japanese commander in Saigon, Marshall Terauchi, threatened 
to have him tried as a war criminal, and ordered him to aid 
the British in fighting the Vietnamese and restoring 
order. Terauchi complied with Gracey•s order. Gracey 
finally managed to obtain a truce with the Vietnamese on 
October 1, but it did not last. On October 16 the 
Vietnamese made a last stand in Saigon. British, French, 
and Japanese troops forced them to abandon the city. The 
first Indochina War had started.n 
The American advisory role in postwar Indochina left a 
strong legacy of French bitterness and mistrust toward the 
31 George F. Sheldon, "The Case for Viet Nam," The
Commonweal, 31 January 1947, 396. 
32 Boettcher, 56. 
122 
United States. The French would view our collusion with the 
Viet Minh as one of the main reasons for their postwar 
difficulties in Vietnam. They conveniently overlooked the 
fact, however, that Washington had agreed, more than three 
months before V-J Day, that the French should return to 
Indochina. The French refused to admit that American aid to 
the Viet Minh had been immaterial. In their 
shortsightedness they failed to realize that the "very 
existence of the Viet Minh was largely a response to French 
exploitation and oppression. 1133 It would take the Viet Minh 
another nine years to defeat the French. They were 
victorious at Dien Bien Phu on May 7, 1954. It then took 
them many more years to defeat the United States and reunify 
their country. 
n Spector, 72-73. 
CHAPTER XI 
CONCLUSIONS 
The United States failure to recognize the nationalist 
movement in Vietnam in 1945 was an oversight for which 
Americans, along with the French, would pay dearly. Ho Chi 
Minh was clearly an intelligent, articulate, and 
charismatic leader who truly admired the ideals of 
democracy. That Ho was inspired by the example set by the 
United States in the Philippines was well known inside and 
outside of government circles. Yet, when World War II 
ended, the United states was not concerned about the fate of 
Vietnam - a small underdeveloped nation located in the 
Pacific's backwaters. 
Despite Roosevelt's keen interest in Indochina during 
the war and his desire to see it placed under an 
international trusteeship, Europe's reconstruction received 
first priority in the minds of most U.S. leaders charged 
with formulating postwar geopolitical strategy. Also, after 
the war, the fear of Communism was uppermost in the minds of 
most American politicians and diplomats. In his "Long 
Telegram," dated February 22, 1946, George F. Kennan had 
warned the United States that Communism was 
a political force committed fanatically to the belief 
that • . • it is desirable and necessary that the 
internal harmony of our society be disrupted, our 
traditional way of life be destroyed, the international 
authority of our state be broken, if Soviet power is to 
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be secure.1 
Those thoughts, coupled with the fact that our aim during 
the war had been to concentrate on the European theater 
before we turned to the Pacific, precluded any serious 
concerns about Southeast Asia's fate or real understanding 
of the Viet Minh. 
Why did the U.S. go along with the French reoccupation 
of Indochina? First, France had been instrumental in the 
success of the American Revolution. The United States could 
ill afford to turn its back on her in her time of need 
following World War II. The U.S. knew that it would be 
foolish to ignore her position in postwar Europe and that 
she would play an instrumental part in the reconstruction 
and rearmament of Europe. Therefore, it silently acquiesced 
to the return of her Indochina colony, and Ho Chi Minh's
nationalist movement was sacrificed on the altar of 
expediency. 
The failure of influential men such as Dean Acheson and 
John Foster Dullas to see the nationalistic motives of 
either Mao Tse-Tung or Ho Chi Minh was a major part of the 
"Red Scare" that pervaded the United States during the 
immediate postwar era. Ultimately, it led to the 
Domino theory justifying U.S. military involvement in 
1 "The Charge in the Soviet Union (Kennan) to the Secretary 
of State," February 22, 1946, Foreign Relations of the United 
States, Eastern Europe; The Soviet Union, 1946. Vol. 6. 
(Washington, D. c.: GPO, 1969), 706. 
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Vietnam. High American officials were willing to 
overlook Chiang Kai-shek's corruption and France's 
maltreatment of its Indochinese colony as long as they 
were anti-communist. The manner in which Vietnam, and Korea 
too, were divided at the end of the war to facilitate the 
surrender and evacuation of the defeated Japanese smacked of 
imperialism. Little did the U.S. realize in 1945 that its 
cavalier way of dividing up smaller countries would 
result in three major wars within the next thirty years. 
Just as the U.S. had done at the end of World War I, it 
brushed off the pleas of minorities seeking independence in 
favor of continued support for colonialism. 
The United States failed to realize that the people of 
Indochina had become politically sensitized. The Vietnamese 
struggled not for Communist ideology, but to throw the white 
man out. oss men like as Archimedes Patti could understand 
the new nationalist fervor in Vietnam and reported it to 
their superiors, who either ignored the information or 
failed to pass it on to those who would grasp its import. 
Because Vietnam was not an important cog in the world of 
geopolitics, it was easy to overlook. But how the U.S. 
could have ignored a leader who used parts of our own 
Declaration of Independence in his Independence Declaration 
defies logic and remains one of those mysteries that will 
never be adequately explained. 
If the events of 1945 Vietnam can teach the U.S. 
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anything, it is that independence movements such Ho Chi 
Minh's should not be overlooked, even when there are larger 
geopolitical concerns which need its attention. The U.S. 
failure to recognize that Ho Chi Minh had the support of his 
people led to two tragic wars and ultimately caused France 
and the United States much misfortune. 
If only someone had paid attention to Patti's reports; 
if only someone had realized that Ho, at heart, was 
a nationalist; if only someone had recognized that Ho's 
grievances against the French were legitimate; if only there 
had not been such an overwhelming aversion to Communism in 
the postwar era; and if only Communism had been seen as a 
tactic of liberation for oppressed peoples, the world might 
have been different. History, however, continues to go its 
own way without taking note of the "ifs" posed by 
historians. 
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